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The Role of Real Annuities and
Indexed Bonds in an Individual
Accounts Retirement Program
Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell,
and James M. Poterba
It is better to have a permanent income than to be
fascinating.
—Oscar Wilde, The Model Millionaire: A Note of Admiration
The current U.S. social security system provides retirees with a real annu-
ity during their retirement years. After a worker’s primary insurance
amount has been determined at the date of retirement, the purchasing
power of social security beneﬁts remains ﬁxed for the balance of the indi-
vidual’s life. This is accomplished by indexing retirement beneﬁts to an-
nual changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Retirees are therefore in-
sulated from inﬂation risk, at least as long as their consumption bundle is
not too diﬀerent from the bundle used to compute the CPI.
Several current reform plans propose to supplement, or partially re-
place, the existing deﬁned-beneﬁt social security system with mandatory
individual deﬁned-contribution accounts. These plans are discussed in
Gramlich (1996), Mitchell, Myers, and Young (1999), and NASI (1998).
In most “individual account” plans, retirees would be required to pur-
chase an annuity with all or part of their accumulated account balances.
Yet the existing market for individual annuities in the United States is
small, the expected present value of annuity payouts is typically below the
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321purchase price of the annuity, and virtually all annuities currently available
oﬀer nominal rather than real payout streams. This has led some to argue
that individual account plans would expose retirees to inﬂation risk that
they do not currently face. If individuals purchase nominal annuities with
their accumulated funds and the inﬂation rate is positive during their pay-
out period, then the real value of their annuity payouts will decline over
time. Even if inﬂation was expected to be positive at the time of the annuity
purchase, some individuals may not recognize this, and they may experi-
ence an unexpected decline in real payouts. This eﬀect is distinct from
the inﬂation risk that arises from diﬀerences between expected and actual
inﬂation rates.
In this paper, we explore four issues concerning real annuities, nominal
annuities, and the inﬂation risks faced by prospective retirees, all of which
are relevant to the prospects for individual accounts under social security
reform. We begin by describing the annuity market in the United King-
dom. Annuitants in the United Kingdom can select from a wide range of
both real and nominal annuity products. The U.K. annuity market demon-
strates the feasibility of oﬀering real annuities in the private marketplace.
Moreover, the current U.K. annuity market may indicate the direction in
which the U.S. annuity market will evolve since indexed bonds promising
a ﬁxed real return to investors have been available in the United Kingdom
for nearly two decades. The availability of such bonds has made it possible
for U.K. insurers to oﬀer real annuity products without bearing inﬂation
risk. Similar bonds have been available in the United States for only two
years. Our evaluation of the U.K. annuity market includes an analysis of
the relative prices of both real and nominal annuities, and we present esti-
mates of how much a potential annuitant must pay to purchase the inﬂa-
tion insurance provided by a real annuity.
Next, we turn to the annuity market in the United States and investigate
the availability of real annuities in this country. In early 1997, the U.S.
government introduced Treasury inﬂation-protection securities (TIPS),
and, since then, two products that might be described as inﬂation-indexed
annuities have come to market. One, oﬀered by the Irish Life Company of
North America (ILONA), promises a constant-purchasing-power stream
of beneﬁts. Although this product oﬀers buyers a real stream of annuity
payouts, there have been no sales to date. The second, oﬀered by TIAA-
CREF, is a variable-payout annuity with payouts linked to returns on the
CREF index-linked bond account. We describe the operation of the latter
account in some detail and explain why, in practice, the TIAA-CREF vari-
able annuity is not an inﬂation-indexed annuity. Our analysis of these two
products suggests that no commercially signiﬁcant real annuities are cur-
rently available in the U.S. annuity market.
We then consider whether a retiree could use a portfolio of stocks or
bonds, in lieu of a portfolio of indexed bonds, to hedge long-term inﬂation
risk. Speciﬁcally, we evaluate how much inﬂation risk annuitants would
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payout annuities with payouts linked to various asset portfolios. We assess
the potential inﬂation protection provided by diﬀerent variable-payout an-
nuities using historical correlation patterns between inﬂation and nominal
returns on stocks, bonds, and bills.
The ﬁnal portion of the analysis explores the expected-utility conse-
quences of annuitizing retirement resources in alternative ways. A stylized
model is used to calculate the expected lifetime utility of a retiree who
could purchase a nominal annuity, a real annuity, and a variable-payout
equity-linked annuity. In the ﬁrst and third cases, the retiree would bear
some inﬂation risk. We calibrate this model using available estimates of
risk aversion, mortality risks, and the stochastic structure of real returns
on corporate stock. Our results suggest that, for plausible values of risk
aversion, retirees would not pay very much for the opportunity to pur-
chase a real rather than a nominal annuity. This ﬁnding is sensitive, how-
ever, to assumptions regarding the stochastic process for inﬂation. Very
high expected inﬂation rates, or very high levels of inﬂation variability, can
reverse this conclusion.
We also ﬁnd that a variable-payout annuity with payouts linked to the
returns on a portfolio of common stocks is more attractive than a real
annuity for consumers with modest risk aversion. This result rests on as-
sumptions about the expected return on stocks relative to riskless assets
and hence must be viewed with some caution since there is substantial
prospective uncertainty about expected stock returns. The ﬁnding never-
theless illustrates the potentially important role of variable-payout annuit-
ies as devices for annuitizing assets from individual accounts.
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections. Section 9.1 presents our ﬁndings
on the real and nominal annuity markets in the United Kingdom. Section
9.2 describes two “inﬂation-linked annuities” oﬀered in the United States.
Section 9.3 reports our ﬁndings on the correlation between unexpected
inﬂation and real returns on various ﬁnancial assets and summarizes pre-
vious research on this relation. This section also presents evidence on the
ex post real payout streams that would have been paid to retirees had they
purchased variable-payout annuities at diﬀerent dates over the last seventy
years. Section 9.4 outlines our algorithm for evaluating the utility beneﬁts
of access to various types of annuity products. We link this work with the
rapidly growing literature on lifetime portfolio allocation in the presence
of risky asset returns and uncertain inﬂation. In a brief concluding section,
we sketch directions for future work.
9.1 The Market for Real Annuities in the United Kingdom
We begin our analysis by describing the real annuity market in the
United Kingdom since it provides important evidence on both the feasibil-
ity of providing real annuities through private insurers and the consumer
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discounted value of payouts on real and nominal annuities currently avail-
able in the United Kingdom.
9.1.1 The Current Structure of the U.K. Annuity Market
Annuities providing a constant real payout stream are widely available
in the United Kingdom. This is partly due to the fact that government-
issued indexed bonds have been available in the United Kingdom for
nearly two decades. Insurance companies holding these bonds can largely
hedge the price-level risk that is associated with oﬀering annuity payouts
denominated in real rather than in nominal terms. (Payouts on indexed
bonds in the United Kingdom adjust to past inﬂation with a lag, which re-
sults in some residual price-level exposure for insurance companies oﬀer-
ing real annuities.) Blake (1999) reports that insurers oﬀering nominal
annuities typically back them by holding nominal government bonds while
those oﬀering real annuities hold indexed bonds.
There are two segments of the individual annuity market in the United
Kingdom, deﬁned according to where funds used to purchase the annuity
have been accumulated. One market segment involves annuities purchased
with tax-qualiﬁed retirement funds; the other is focused on annuities pur-
chased outside such plans. Qualiﬁed retirement plans in Britain include
deﬁned-beneﬁt occupation pension schemes and personal pension plans
(PPPs). Most occupation plans are deﬁned-beneﬁt plans, and the annuit-
ies that are paid out to their beneﬁciaries are not purchased in the individ-
ual annuity market. PPPs, available since 1988, are retirement-saving plans
that are broadly similar to individual retirement accounts in the United
States. (Prior to 1988, a similar type of plan was available only to self-
employed individuals.) Contributions to PPPs are tax deductible, and in-
come on the assets held in such plans is not taxed until the funds are
withdrawn. Budd and Campbell (1998) report that, in the early 1990s,
roughly one-quarter of U.K. workers participated in a personal pension
plan. These plans are likely to account for most of the purchases of quali-
ﬁed annuities since deﬁned-contribution plans constitute a minority of
U.K. occupation pensions.
Those who reach retirement age with assets in a deﬁned-contribution
occupation pension, or with assets in a personal pension plan, are legally
required to annuitize at least part of their pension accumulation. For this
reason, the U.K. market for annuities purchased with funds from qualiﬁed
pension plans is known as the compulsory annuity market. In recent years,
there has been some relaxation of the rules requiring annuitization. Cur-
rently, a retiree can withdraw up to one-quarter of a personal pension plan
accumulation as a lump-sum distribution, and assets can be held in the
PPP up to age seventy-ﬁve before they must be annuitized.
The U.K. annuity market also includes a second segment, which con-
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sory” market. In this second market segment, funds accumulated outside
qualiﬁed retirement plans are used to purchase annuity products.
The demographic characteristics and mortality prospects of annuity
buyers in the compulsory and noncompulsory markets are likely to diﬀer.
The set of people who purchase annuities in the voluntary market is likely
to have better mortality prospects (i.e., longer life expectancies) than the
U.K. population at large. In addition, workers who have PPPs or who
are covered by deﬁned-contribution occupation plans are probably not a
random subset of the population. They may also have better longevity
prospects than those of the population at large. Finkelstein and Poterba
(1999) compare the U.K. compulsory and noncompulsory annuity mar-
kets and show that payouts as a fraction of premiums are somewhat lower
in the noncompulsory market than in the compulsory market. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the view that adverse selection among annuitants receiv-
ing employer pensions is less substantial than adverse selection among
people buying individual annuities outside a retirement plan. Our analysis
focuses on annuities oﬀered in the “compulsory-annuity” marketplace.
The compulsory annuitization requirement for personal pension plans
has created a substantial group of retirement-age individuals in the United
Kingdom who must purchase an annuity. To service their needs, annuity
brokers exist to help retirees obtain quotes on annuity products. We con-
tacted several of these brokers and requested data on U.K. annuity prices
and the terms of annuity contracts. We obtained data from a number of
ﬁrms. While we have not established precisely how much of the annuity
market our sample ﬁrms cover, our sample of insurance companies ap-
pears to include most of the major annuity providers.
To focus the discussion, we restrict our attention to nominal and
inﬂation-linked single-life annuity products. Here, the term nominal is used
to refer to values denominated in current pounds (or dollars), while real
refers to inﬂation-corrected pounds or dollars. We analyze products of-
fered by nine insurance companies oﬀering retail price index (RPI)-linked
single-life annuity policies and fourteen companies oﬀering nominal
single-life products. (By comparison, there are nearly one hundred insur-
ance companies oﬀering individual annuity products in the United States,
according to A. M. Best’s surveys.) We do not consider “graded” nominal
annuity policies that oﬀer a rising stream of nominal beneﬁts over the
life of the annuitant, with a prespeciﬁed nominal escalation rate. Graded
annuities provide annuitants with a way of backloading the real value of
payouts from their annuities, but they do not insure against inﬂation ﬂuc-
tuations as real annuities do. We focus our attention on policies that were
available in late August 1998, and we consider annuities with a £100,000
purchase price (premium).
Table 9.1 reports mean monthly payouts for both nominal and RPI-
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the sample average payout for each type of annuity. They indicate that the
ﬁrst-month payout on a real annuity is between 25 and 30 percent lower
than the ﬁrst-month payout on a nominal annuity. This reduction in initial
beneﬁts is sometimes cited as the reason why some consumers shy away
from indexed annuities; later in the paper, we discuss a number of other
potential explanations for consumer reluctance to purchase real annuities.
The data also indicate diﬀerences in the ratio of nominal to real annuity
payouts across age groups (real annuities are priced more favorably with
rising age) and between men and women (real annuities are priced more
favorably for men). These presumably reﬂect mortality-related diﬀerences
in the expected duration of payouts under diﬀerent annuity contracts.
We also see substantial variation in the annuity beneﬁts paid by the
diﬀerent insurers, as was previously found for the U.S. annuity market by
Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (hereafter MPWB) (1999).
The third and fourth columns of table 9.1 report the coeﬃcient of varia-
tion for monthly annuity payouts in both markets; here, we see that the
pricing of indexed annuities varies more than that of nominal annuities.
For ﬁve of the six “products” deﬁned by the age and gender of the buyer,
the coeﬃcient of variation is greater for the real than for the nominal
annuity. This may be due to the fact that the eﬀective duration of a real
annuity is longer than that of a nominal annuity so that the insurer’s cost
of providing a real annuity is more sensitive to future developments in
mortality patterns. Explaining the observed price dispersion in annuity
markets is an important task for future research.
9.1.2 Evaluating the “Money’s Worth” of Nominal and Real Annuities
To evaluate the administrative and other costs associated with the indi-
vidual annuities oﬀered in the U.K. market, we compute the expected pres-
Table 9.1 Summary Statistics on Nominal and Real Annuities Available in the Compulsory
Annuity Market in the United Kingdom, 1998
Average Monthly Payout Coeﬃcient of Variation
for a £100,000 Annuity for Annuity Prices
Annuity Buyer Characteristics Nominal Real Nominal Real
Man, 60 years old 666.20 476.35 4.26 6.09
Man, 65 years old 754.80 563.20 3.36 6.29
Man, 70 years old 872.94 679.50 2.88 6.31
Woman, 60 years old 602.99 416.81 5.34 5.02
Woman, 65 years old 666.88 482.70 4.27 4.49
Woman, 70 years old 760.50 575.06 3.65 4.48
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data provided by U.K. annuity brokers. Reference date is 21
August 1998. Sample consists of fourteen large insurance companies that provide annuities. Data were
provided by Annuity Direct, Ltd. All annuity products analyzed in this table oﬀer a ﬁve-year guaran-
tee period.
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average index-linked annuity. We compare this EPDV with the premium
cost of the annuity to obtain a measure of the “money’s worth” of the
individual annuity. Warshawsky (1988), Friedman and Warshawsky (1988,
1990), and MPWB (1999) report results of “money’s worth” calculations
for annuities oﬀered in the United States.
The formula used to calculate the EPDV of a nominal annuity with a























We assume that no annuity buyer lives beyond age 115, and we truncate
the annuity calculation after 12  (115  b) months. Pj denotes the proba-
bility that an individual of age b years at the time of the annuity purchase
survives for at least j months after buying the annuity. The variable ik
denotes the one-month nominal interest rate k months after the annuity
purchase.
For a real annuity, equation (1) must be modiﬁed to recognize that the
amount of the payout is time varying in nominal terms but ﬁxed in real
terms. The easiest way to handle this is to allow Ar to denote the real
monthly payout and to replace the nominal interest rates in the denomina-
tor of (1) with corresponding real interest rates. We use rk to denote the
one-month real interest rate k months after the annuity purchase. Such
real interest rates can be constructed from the U.K. yield curve for index-
linked Treasury securities. The expression that we evaluate to compute the























We evaluate (1) and (2) using projected survival probabilities for the
U.K. population as a whole. These mortality probabilities are compiled
by H.M. Treasury. We use cohort mortality tables for those who reached
age sixty, sixty-ﬁve, or seventy in 1998. We were not able to obtain mortal-
ity tables corresponding to the annuitant population. By using population
mortality tables, we are in eﬀect asking what the EPDV of the average an-
nuity would be when viewed from the perspective of an average individual
in the population. Of course, the average annuity buyer has a longer life
expectancy than the average person in the population. Since a real annuity
oﬀers larger payouts near the end of life than a nominal annuity does,
using a population rather than an annuitant mortality table overstates the
eﬀective cost of purchasing an inﬂation-indexed annuity relative to a nom-
inal annuity.
Table 9.2 reports EPDV calculations for single-life annuities for men
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sults for the average annuity payout are given as a simple average across
the ﬁrms in our sample. We also provide the EPDV using average payouts
for the three highest and three lowest annuity payout ﬁrms in our sample.
The results show that the cost of buying an inﬂation-protected annuity in
the United Kingdom is about 5 percent of the annuity premium. In addi-
tion, we ﬁnd that the EPDV of a nominal annuity contract purchased in
conjunction with a qualiﬁed retirement-saving plan is 5 percent higher
than that for a real annuity. While the EPDV for nominal annuities is ap-
proximately 90 percent of the premium cost, the analogous EPDV for real
annuities is about 85 percent. This diﬀerence in EPDVs might explain Dia-
mond’s (1997) claim that most annuitants in the United Kingdom elect
nominal rather than real annuities.
Some of the apparent “cost” of inﬂation protection may arise from ad-
verse selection across various types of annuities. If annuitants who antici-
pate that they will live much longer than the average annuitant tend to
purchase real annuities because their real payout stream is backloaded,
then mortality rates for those who buy real annuities may be lower than
those for nominal annuity buyers. We do not know whether such mortality
diﬀerences actually explain the payout diﬀerences between nominal and
real annuities.
Our estimates of the EPDV of nominal annuity payouts in the United
Kingdom are somewhat higher than analogous estimates for nominal an-
nuity products in the United States at roughly the same date. For example,
Poterba and Warshawsky (2000) report that the average EPDV on U.S.
nominal annuity contracts available to sixty-ﬁve-year-old men in 1998 (us-
ing the population mortality table) was 84 percent for annuities purchased
through qualiﬁed retirement-saving plans. The lower U.S. payout may re-
Table 9.2 Expected Present Discounted Value of Annuity Payouts for Nominal and Real
Annuities Available in the Compulsory Annuity Market, United Kingdom,
August 1998
Nominal Annuity Inﬂation-Indexed Annuity
Characteristics of Average Highest Lowest Average Highest Lowest
Annuitant Payout Three Three Payout Three Three
Male, 60 years old .921 .953 .873 .867 .916 .808
Male, 65 years old .908 .936 .868 .854 .898 .797
Male, 70 years old .889 .917 .853 .836 .881 .783
Female, 60 years old .928 .966 .861 .876 .924 .832
Female, 65 years old .907 .942 .857 .857 .892 .812
Female, 70 years old .886 .920 .841 .836 .869 .790
Source: Authors’ calculations as described in the text. Sample consists of fourteen companies with data
provided by Annuity Direct, Ltd. See source note to table 9.1 above.
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tion as a whole, in the “qualiﬁed” (U.S.) and “compulsory” (U.K.) annu-
ity markets.
Table 9.2 also suggests that there are systematic patterns in the money’s-
worth values across age groups for both nominal and real annuities in the
U.K. market. The EPDV declines as a function of the annuitant’s age at
the time the annuity is purchased. One possible explanation for this pat-
tern may be that those who retire later tend to have lower mortality rates
than those who retire earlier. Age at retirement and age at annuity pur-
chase may be linked more closely in the compulsory annuity market than
in the noncompulsory market. We suspect that many compulsory annuity
buyers purchase their annuities when they retire, even though current U.K.
rules do not require such purchases.
The results shown in table 9.2 indicate that, for a retiree of given age/
sex characteristics, there is frequently a 10 percent diﬀerence between the
average annuity payout from the ﬁrms oﬀering the highest payout annui-
ties and those oﬀering the lowest payouts. Such dispersion is consistent
with earlier evidence, such as MPWB (1999), suggesting substantial pric-
ing diﬀerences in the U.S. market for nominal annuities. This price disper-
sion raises the question of how potential annuitants choose among the
various annuity products. In the U.S. case, MPWB (1999) report little
correlation between factors such as the credit rating of the insurance com-
pany oﬀering the annuity and the level of the annuity’s payout.
In sum, we draw two lessons from the widespread availability of index-
linked annuities in the U.K. annuity market. The ﬁrst is that it is possible
for private insurers to develop and oﬀer real annuity products. This is
surely easier in a nation with a well-developed market for index-linked
bonds. The second lesson is that, on the basis of the current prices of
nominal and real annuities, the costs of obtaining inﬂation insurance are
less than 5 percent of the purchase price of a nominal annuity contract.
9.2 Real Annuities in the United States: TIAA-CREF and ILONA
The U.S. individual annuity market diﬀers from that in the United King-
dom in that virtually all annuity products are nominal annuities. Individu-
als can purchase a variety of products with a graded payout structure so
that the nominal value of their payouts (and, for low-enough inﬂation
rates, the real value of payouts) is expected to rise over time. Only two
annuity products of which we are aware promise some degree of inﬂation
protection. The ﬁrst is the “Freedom” CPI-indexed income annuity, of-
fered by the Irish Life Company of North America (ILONA), and the sec-
ond is the inﬂation-linked bond account annuity, oﬀered by TIAA-CREF.
In this section, we describe how these products work, their current prices
and payouts, and the degree to which they provide inﬂation protection
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securities (TIPS) were introduced to the U.S. market only recently, ad-
ditional insurers may oﬀer real annuities as familiarity with these new
assets grows. Insurance companies can hedge the inﬂation risk associated
with these price-level-indexed annuity products by purchasing TIPS
bonds.
9.2.1 The ILONA Real Annuity
Irish Life PLC, an international insurance ﬁrm headquartered in Dub-
lin, oﬀers index-linked annuities in the United States through the Inter-
state Assurance Company, which is a division of Irish Life of North
America. Interstate is a well-regarded company: it had assets of $1.3 bil-
lion, and it received a AA rating from Duﬀ and Phelps, an A rating from
A. M. Best, and a AA rating from Standard and Poor’s in 1996. The
indexed-annuity product from ILONA is the “Freedom CPI-Indexed In-
come Annuity.” The annuity payout rises annually in step with the increase
in the prior year’s CPI. Annuity beneﬁts from the Freedom CPI-indexed
income annuity cannot decline in nominal terms, even if the CPI were to
fall from year to year. The minimum purchase requirement for the ILONA
annuity product is $10,000, and the maximum purchase is $1 million. The
annuity is available to individuals between the ages of sixty-ﬁve and
eighty-ﬁve. There are various payout options, including simple-life annuit-
ies, annuities that provide a ﬁxed numbers of years of payouts for certain,
and “refund annuities.” These annuity products are available both as indi-
vidual and as joint-and-survivor annuities. Although ILONA oﬀers this
real annuity product in the United States, the agent we contacted indicated
that thus far no sales of these annuities have been recorded.
Data were obtained on the monthly payouts oﬀered by ILONA’s in-
dexed and nominal single-premium immediate annuities for men and
women aged sixty-ﬁve, seventy, and seventy-ﬁve, assuming a premium of
$1 million in each case. We also obtained data on joint-and-survivor annu-
ities with 100 percent survivor beneﬁts. Policies purchased in mid-1998
oﬀered a monthly payout on a real annuity at the start of the annuity
contract about 30 percent smaller than the payout on a nominal annuity
issued to the same individual. Table 9.3 shows that, for men at age sixty-
ﬁve, the ratio of real to nominal payouts is 69 percent. For women at sixty-
ﬁve, the ratio is 66 percent, potentially reﬂecting the longer life expectancy
and therefore greater backloading that occurs with a real rather than a
nominal annuity for women rather than for men.
To determine the payouts relative to premium cost for these annuities,
we calculate the EPDV of annuity payouts for each of the ILONA policies
quoted using a procedure similar to that described above. Interest and
mortality rates diﬀer somewhat relative to the U.K. calculations. For dis-
count factors in our EPDV calculations, we use the nominal yield curve
for zero-coupon U.S. Treasury bonds. We start from the term structure of
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monthly interest rates implied by these yields under the simple-
expectations theory of the term structure. Data on the zero-coupon yield
curve are published in the Wall Street Journal, and we use information
from the beginning of June 1998. Because we do not know the precise date
at which ILONA oﬀered the annuities that we are pricing, and in the light
of the absence of transactions in this annuity market, we select the term
structure for the ﬁrst week of June 1998 as an approximate guide to dis-
count rates in mid-1998. When evaluating the EPDV of the ILONA real
annuity, we use the implied short-term real interest rates that can be de-
rived from the term structure of real interest rates on TIPS in early June
1998.
With regard to survival patterns, we have access to two distinct mortal-
ity tables for the United States. The ﬁrst, developed by the Social Security
Administration’s Oﬃce of the Actuary and reported in Bell, Wade, and
Goss (1992), applies to the entire population. We update this mortality
table to reﬂect the prospective mortality rates of a sixty-ﬁve-year-old (or
seventy- or seventy-ﬁve-year-old) purchasing an annuity in 1998. For ex-
ample, in estimating the money’s worth of an annuity for a sixty-ﬁve-year-
old in 1998, we use the projected mortality experience of the 1933 birth
cohort. A second set of projected mortality rates corresponds to that rele-
vant to current annuitants. MPWB (1999) develop an algorithm that com-
bines information from the annuity 2000 mortality table (described in Jo-
hansen [1996]), the older 1983 individual annuitant mortality table, and
the projected rate of mortality improvement implicit in the diﬀerence be-
tween the Social Security Administration’s cohort and period mortality
tables for the population. This algorithm generates projected mortality
rates for the set of annuitants purchasing annuity contracts in a given year.
It is worth noting that the population and annuitant mortality rates diﬀer.
For instance, MPWB (1999) report that the 1995 annual mortality rate for
annuitants aged sixty-ﬁve to seventy-ﬁve was roughly half that for the gen-
Table 9.3 Monthly Annuity Payouts on Single-Premium Annuity Products Oﬀered
by ILONA in the U.S. Market, 1998
Joint-and-Survivor
Annuitant Age Male, Single-Life Female, Single-Life Annuity with Full
and Product Annuity ($) Annuity ($) Survivor Beneﬁts ($)
Age 65, unindexed 7,452 6,720 6,068
Age 65, indexed 5,149 4,432 3,849
Age 70, unindexed 8,520 7,543 6,663
Age 70, indexed 6,262 5,332 4,549
Age 75, unindexed 10,075 8,825 7,594
Age 75, indexed 7,833 6,643 5,552
Note: All payouts correspond to an initial purchase of $1 million. Data were provided by
Irish Life of North America (ILONA). For further details, see the text.
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EPDV of annuity payouts with the annuitant rather than the population
mortality table.
Table 9.4 reports EPDV calculations for Irish Life real and nominal
annuities. (All EPDV calculations use pretax annuity payouts and before-
tax interest rates. MPWB [1999] show that pretax and posttax EPDV cal-
culations for U.S. nominal annuities yield similar results.) For nominal
annuities valued using the population mortality table, the EPDV of pay-
outs is approximately eighty-ﬁve cents per premium dollar for men and
eighty-nine cents for women. These values are slightly higher than the av-
erage EPDV values based on nominal annuities described in A. M. Best’s
annuity survey of June 1998, as reported in Poterba and Warshawsky
(2000). Using the annuitant mortality table for nominal annuities, the
EPDV is larger: approximately ninety-eight cents per premium dollar for
men and ninety-seven cents for women.
We next turn to EPDV results for the ILONA real annuity, and we see
that the value per dollar of premium is much lower than for the nominal
annuity. For instance, a sixty-ﬁve-year-old man purchasing a real annuity
wouldexpectanEPDVof70percent,versus86percentforthenominalan-
nuity. At other ages, a similar pattern applies: the money’s worth for real
annuity products is typically 15–20 percent lower than that for nominal
annuities. The fact that inﬂation protection adds more than 15 percent to
the annuity’s cost may explain the limited demand for this product in the
United States.
9.2.2 Annuities Linked to the CREF Index-Linked
Bond Account (ILBA)
In May 1997, the College Equities Retirement Fund (CREF) launched
a new investment account that was intended to appeal to those who are
Table 9.4 Expected Present Discounted Value of Annuity Payouts, Freedom Inﬂation-
Indexed Annuities Oﬀered by ILONA, 1998
Male Male Female Female
Annuitant, Annuitant, Annuitant, Annuitant,
Age 65 Age 75 Age 65 Age 75
Calculations using population
mortality table:
Nominal annuity .864 .830 .889 .887
Real annuity .702 .720 .708 .762
Calculations using annuitant
mortality table:
Nominal annuity .987 .984 .966 .967
Real annuity .822 .872 .782 .841
Note: Each entry shows the expected present discounted value of annuity payouts using the algorithm
described in the text. See note to table 9.3 above.
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product, called the CREF Inﬂation-Linked Bond Account (ILBA), fol-
lowed from the federal government’s decision to issue TIPS on 29 January
1997. TIAA-CREF (1997a) indicated that its new inﬂation-linked account
was expected to be useful for providing participants with “another invest-
ment option that can enhance portfolio diversiﬁcation and mitigate the
long-term impact of inﬂation on their retirement accumulations and bene-
ﬁts.” The fund’s goal was described, in TIAA-CREF (1997b), as seeking
“a long-term rate of return that outpaces inﬂation, through a portfolio of
inﬂation-indexed bonds and other securities.”
The CREF inﬂation-linked bond account has grown slowly since its
inception. At the end of September 1998, the account had attracted invest-
ments of only $131 million, making it the smallest of all the retirement
funds oﬀered by TIAA-CREF. To place this amount in context, on the
same date the CREF stock fund held $96.9 billion, the TIAA traditional
annuity fund held $94.3 billion, and all other TIAA-CREF retirement
funds combined held about $25 billion. Most of the funds held in the
ILBA are in the accounts of TIAA-CREF active participants rather than
retirees, and as such they are still accumulating rather than drawing
down assets.
To describe the inﬂation protection that an annuity linked to the CREF
ILBA provides, we need to provide some background on the structure of
this account, on the basic structure of variable-annuity products, and on
the speciﬁc operation of the CREF variable annuity.
The CREF Index-Linked Bond Account
TIAA-CREF (1998b) explains that the ILBA “invests mainly in
inﬂation-indexed bonds issued or guaranteed by the US government, or
its agencies and instrumentalities, and in other inﬂation-indexed securi-
ties” with foreign securities capped at 25 percent of the assets. At present,
the ILBA holds 98 percent of its assets in U.S. government inﬂation-linked
securities and 2 percent in short-term investments maturing in less than
one year. In principle, the fund’s asset allocation could become broader in
the future, with corporate inﬂation-indexed securities and those issued by
foreign governments potentially being included as well as money market
instruments. Expenses total thirty-one basis points annually. This expense
ratio is lower than many mutual and pension fund expense levels, but it is
as high as other, more actively managed CREF accounts such as the stock
account (thirty-one basis points) and the bond market account (twenty-
nine basis points) (see www.tiaa-cref.org).
The ILBA has no sales, surrender, or premium charges. Participants
may elect this account as one of several investment vehicles into which
new retirement contributions may be made and/or into which existing as-
sets from other TIAA-CREF accounts may be transferred. As with other
CREF accounts, the participant is limited to one transfer per business day
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be used as a vehicle for accumulating retirement assets, or it can be used
to back the payment stream for a variable-payout annuity. Most of our
interest focuses on the second function.
The ILBA account is marked to market daily, meaning that asset values
ﬂuctuate and the account could lose money. For example, if real interest
rates rose owing to a decline in expected inﬂation, bond prices could fall.
As the fund prospectus (TIAA-CREF 1998a) points out, in such an event,
the inﬂation-linked bond fund’s total return would then not actually track
inﬂation every year. This is a key feature of the ILBA, and it means that
the account does not eﬀectively oﬀer a real payout stream to annuitants
who purchase variable-payout annuities tied to the ILBA.
Real interest rate changes are not the only source of variation in ILBA
returns. If the principal value of inﬂation-linked bonds changes in re-
sponse to inﬂation shocks, perhaps because investors infer something
about the future of real interest rates from inﬂation news, this would also
aﬀect the returns on the ILBA. Similarly, changes in the deﬁnition of the
CPI might aﬀect the ILBA return. Both these issues also arise with respect
to direct investments in Treasury inﬂation-protection securities (TIPS).
The ILBA return for 1998 was 3.48 percent. Table 9.5 illustrates that this
made it the lowest-earning fund of all the tax-qualiﬁed accounts oﬀered
by TIAA-CREF in 1998.
Variable Annuities: General Structure
An annuity with payouts that rise and fall with the value of the CREF
ILBA is a special case of a variable-payout annuity. The key distinction
between a ﬁxed annuity (including a graded ﬁxed annuity with a prespeci-
ﬁed set of changing nominal payouts over time) and a variable annuity is
that the payouts on a variable annuity cannot be speciﬁed for certain at
the beginning of the payout period. Rather, a variable annuity is deﬁned
by an initial payout amount, which we denote A(0), and an “updating
Table 9.5 Total Return, 1 January 1998–31 December 1998, by
TIAA-CREF Account (%)
CREF Accounts TIAA Accounts
Inﬂation-linked bond account 3.48 Traditional annuity 6.71
Growth account 32.89 Real estate account 8.07
Stock account 22.94 Personal annuity stock index 23.84
Equity index account 24.12 account
Social choice account 18.61
Global equities account 18.58
Bond market 8.60
Money market 5.45
Source: www.tiaa-cref.org, various pages.
334 Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, and James M. Poterbarule” that relates the annuity payout in future periods to the previous pay-
out and the intervening returns on the portfolio that backs the variable an-
nuity.
To determine the initial nominal payout on a single-life variable annuity


















where R is the variable annuity’s “assumed interest rate” (AIR) or the
“annuity valuation rate” as in Bodie and Pesando (1983). T is the maxi-
mum potential life span of the annuitant. This expression would require
modiﬁcation if the annuity guaranteed a ﬁxed number of payments for
certain, regardless of the annuitant’s longevity, or if there were other spe-
cialized features in the annuity contract. This expression ignores expenses
and other administrative costs associated with the sales of annuities or the
operation of insurance companies.
The annuity-updating rule depends on the return on the assets that back
the annuity, which we denote by zt, according to
(4) At At z R t ()( ) ( ) / ( ) . += ⋅+ + 11 1
The frequency with which payouts are updated varies across annuity prod-
ucts, and there is no requirement that the payout be updated every time it
is paid. One could, for example, have an annuity with monthly payouts
but quarterly updating.
In designing a variable annuity, the assumed interest rate (R)i sak e y
parameter. Assuming a high value of R will enable the insurance company
to oﬀer a large initial premium, but, for any underlying portfolio, the
stream of future payouts will be more likely to decline as the assumed
value of R rises. Equation (4) clearly indicates that an individual who
purchases a variable annuity will receive payouts that ﬂuctuate with the
nominal value of the underlying portfolio.
Speciﬁc Provisions of the CREF ILBA-Backed Annuity
When a TIAA-CREF participant terminates employment, he or she can
begin receiving retirement beneﬁts. The participant then decides how to
manage the payouts from accumulated retirement accounts. This includes
deciding whether to annuitize the retirement assets, how much to annui-
tize, and whether to use an inﬂation-linked annuity. (Some employers may
restrict their retirees’ options.) Beneﬁts are payable monthly, although re-
cipients may elect quarterly, semiannual, and annual payouts as an alter-
native (TIAA-CREF [1998d] provides more detail on these options). In
addition, the participant can choose the form and duration of the payout
pattern, subject to minimum-distribution rules set by the IRS. If the par-
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variety of potential annuity structures, including life annuities, ten- and
twenty-year certain-payout annuities, and joint-and-survivor as well as
single-life products.
Under TIAA-CREF rules, a CREF participant electing an annuity can-
not be more than ninety years of age when he or she initially applies for
the annuity. TIAA-CREF (1998b) explains that the applicant must select
at least one of the annuity accounts initially for the drawdown phase;
thereafter, he or she may switch from one annuity account to another as
often as once per quarter. There are restrictions on shifting funds from
TIAA to CREF: this must take place over a longer horizon. The choice
of annuity fund can be altered, but the form of beneﬁt payout cannot be
changed once the annuity has been issued.
In order to understand how CREF annuity payments are determined,
it is necessary to deﬁne the basic annuity unit value. This is an amount set
each 31 March by dividing an account’s total funds in payment status by
the actuarial present value of the future annuity beneﬁts to be paid out,
assuminga4p e r c e n tnominal interest rate and mortality patterns charac-
teristic of existing CREF annuitants. A unisex version of the mortality
table for individual annuitants is used when the applicant ﬁrst ﬁles for an
annuity “set back for each complete year elapsed since 1986” (see TIAA-
CREF 1998d). The same mortality table is applied to all TIAA-CREF an-
nuity accounts, on the basis of participant mortality experience. Mortality
experience is adjusted every quarter.
A newly retired participant seeking to annuitize his retirement sum must
have his own accumulation amount translated into an initial annuity
amount (A(0)), determined by dividing his accumulation by the product
of an annuity factor and the basic annuity unit value just described. The
annuity factor reﬂects assumed survival probabilities based on the annu-
itant’s age and an eﬀective annual assumed interest rate (AIR) of 4 percent
nominal, explained in TIAA-CREF (1998c).
The participant’s initial annuity amount is then adjusted over the life of
the annuity contract on either a monthly or an annual basis, depending
on the participant’s election. The adjustment will reﬂect the actual fund
earnings on a “total return” basis, relative to the 4 percent AIR. Actual
investment performance is used to update the annuity values as of 1 May
for those electing to have their income change annually or monthly for
those electing monthly income changes. Because the investment returns
on the underlying accounts aﬀect annuity payouts, these TIAA-CREF
annuities are variable-payout annuities.
The Extent of Inﬂation Protection
It is evident that a variable-payout annuity linked to the CREF ILBA
does not provide a guaranteed stream of real payouts since it is marked
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with inﬂation, the participant’s unit value would not be constant in real
terms. More important, the CREF annuity may fail to keep up with inﬂa-
tion because of the way in which it is designed. When the ﬁrst-year annuity
payout is set, it assumes the 4 percent AIR mentioned above, which is the
same rate used for other CREF annuities. In subsequent years, if the unit
value of the account were to rise less than 4 percent, payouts would be
reduced to reﬂect this lower valuation. Consider the experience of 1998,
when the total return (after expenses) on the ILBA account was 3.48 per-
cent. Since the AIR for the CREF annuity is 4 percent, an annuity in its
second- or later-year payout phase would experience a decline in payout
of 0.52 percent. Since the price level rose in 1998, it is clear that the annu-
ity payouts are not constant in real terms. A necessary condition for the
payouts on this variable annuity not to decline in real terms would be for
the real return on the account, that is, on Treasury inﬂation-protection
securities, to exceed 4 percent. At present, it does not.
The precise extent to which payouts on ILBA-backed variable annuities
will vary in real terms in the future is an open question. If the prices of
inﬂation-linked bonds are bid up during high-inﬂation periods and real
interest rates decline at such times, this will partly protect the ILBA ac-
count value. One relevant comparison for potential annuitants, however,
may be between holding a CREF ILBA-backed variable annuity and pur-
chasing TIPS bonds directly. Two considerations are relevant to such a
comparison. First, the TIPS bonds oﬀer a more direct form of inﬂation
protection, although they do not provide any risk sharing with respect to
mortality risk. Second, there are tax diﬀerences between the two invest-
ment strategies. TIPS would be taxable if they were not held in a qualiﬁed
pension account, while the income from bonds held in the CREF ILBA-
backed account is not taxed until the proceeds are withdrawn.
The CREF variable-payout annuity linked to the ILBA would be more
likely to deliver a future real payout stream if the AIR on this annuity
were set equal to the real interest rate on long-term TIPS at the time when
the annuity is purchased. In this case, the return on the bond portfolio
would typically equal the AIR plus the annual inﬂation rate, leaving aside
some of the risks of holding indexed bonds, such as changes in the way
the CPI is constructed. This would provide a mechanism for delivering
something closer to a real annuity payout stream. One diﬃculty with this
approach is that it would make it more diﬃcult for annuitants to take
advantage of some of the investment ﬂexibility currently provided by
CREF. At present, all CREF annuities assume the same AIR, regardless
of the assets that back them. This facilitates conversions from one annuity
type to another.
To date, there has been very limited demand for CREF’s ILBA-backed
variable-payout annuities. This lack of demand raises the perennial ques-
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One reason often given is “inﬂation illusion”; that is, people simply do
not understand how inﬂation erodes purchasing power. Another reason
may be that inﬂation-proof assets are new and that investors have not yet
learned how to think about such assets. Hammond (personal communica-
tion to O. Mitchell, 10 November 1998) notes that inﬂation-linked bonds
in other countries took some time to become popular after they were in-
troduced: “After a ﬂurry of initial interest, inﬂation bonds in those coun-
tries went through a period of quiescence—low liquidity and little interest.
Then, with some sort of trigger—renewed inﬂation or a strong commit-
ment on the part of central government—the market picked up and
people began to ﬁgure out what the bonds were good for. In the U.K. this
process took about ten years.” (See Hammond 1999.) The United States
today may be in the early stages of this process.
9.2.3 Conclusions about Real Annuities in the United States
Our analysis of the ILONA and TIAA-CREF experience suggests that
there is currently no market for genuine real annuities in the United States.
While ILONA oﬀers a product that guarantees a real stream of payouts,
no one has yet purchased this annuity. This may reﬂect the fact that the
instrument’s pricing requires relatively high rates of inﬂation to generate
beneﬁts with EPDVs similar to those of nominal annuities oﬀered by
ILONA and other insurers. The inﬂation-linked bond account oﬀered by
CREF has attracted investment funds since it became available in 1997,
but the CREF variable annuity with payouts linked to returns on inﬂation-
indexed bonds does not guarantee its buyers a constant real payout
stream. Although in practice it may come close to delivering a constant
real payout, its performance will depend on the as yet uncertain move-
ments in the prices of Treasury inﬂation-protection securities (TIPS).
9.3 Asset Returns and Inﬂation: Another Route to Inﬂation Insurance
We now shift from our focus on insurance contracts that explicitly pro-
vide a constant real income stream for retirees to consider the possibility
of using variable-payout annuities linked to assets other than indexed
bonds as an alternative means of avoiding inﬂation risk. Such variable-
payout annuities may reduce the eﬀect of inﬂation in two ways. First, they
may oﬀer higher average returns than the assets that are used in pricing
real and nominal annuities. These returns may, of course, come at the price
of greater payout variability. Second, the prices of the assets that underlie
the variable-payout annuities may move in tandem with the price level. In
this case, a variable-payout annuity could provide a form of inﬂation in-
surance.
To examine these arguments, we begin by summarizing the well-known
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1926–97 Average
Investment Portfolio
Cash (no Treasury Treasury Corporate
Value after N Years investment return) Bills Bonds Stock
5 years 0.864 1.036 1.128 1.477
(0.150) (0.163) (0.315) (0.517)
10 years 0.729 1.047 1.233 2.214
(0.205) (0.245) (0.561) (1.071)
20 years 0.490 1.013 1.161 4.569
(0.160) (0.285) (0.560) (2.941)
30 years 0.356 1.033 1.112 8.679
(0.129) (0.324) (0.478) (4.728)
Note: Each entry shows the mean value of a one-dollar initial investment, in real terms,
and the standard error (in parentheses) of this value. Calculations are based on authors’
computations using actual realizations of inﬂation, bill, bond, and stock returns over the
period 1926–97, as reported in Ibbotson Associates (1998).
historical real-return performance of U.S. stocks, bonds, and Treasury-bill
investments. We consider an individual who invests $1 in cash or in a
portfolio of Treasury bills, long-term bonds, or corporate stock. We calcu-
late the real value of an initial $1 investment after ﬁve, ten, twenty, and
thirty years. We ﬁrst perform this calculation in 1926 so that the thirty-
year-return interval concludes in 1955. We then repeat the calculation in
1927, 1928, and all subsequent years for which we have enough data to
calculate long-term returns. The last year for which we have return infor-
mation is 1997, so we ﬁnish our ﬁve-year calculations in 1993, our ten-
year calculations in 1988, and so on.
To summarize the results on the real value of each investment, we calcu-
late both the average real value of each investment, averaged across all the
years with suﬃcient data, and the standard deviation of this real return.
The results of these calculations appear in table 9.6. The underlying calcu-
lations have been done using actual returns on stocks, bills, and bonds
over the period 1926–97. For the return after ﬁve (thirty) years, there are
sixty-six (forty-one) overlapping return intervals. The results presented in
table 9.6 show that holding cash worth $1 initially would have a real value
of only forty-nine cents after twenty years on average. In contrast, a $1
initial investment in bills or bonds would have increased in real value. For
bills, the cumulative real return over twenty years was 1.3 percent, while
for bonds it was 16.1 percent.
The last column of table 9.6 shows comparable calculations for corpo-
rate stock. Here, the real value of the investment after twenty years would
have increased by a factor of 4.5. This implies that an investor who pur-
chased an income stream tied to the total return on the U.S. stock market,
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ceive a real income stream that is higher late in retirement than at the
beginning of retirement. This stands in stark contrast to the declining real
value of the payouts on a ﬁxed nominal annuity contract.
The substantial real return on U.S. equities suggests that one method
of obtaining partial long-term protection against inﬂationary erosion of
annuity payouts might be to purchase a portfolio of equities and then to
link annuity payouts to equity returns. Such a strategy exposes the annu-
itant to the substantial intrinsic volatility of the equity market and does
not guarantee a ﬁxed real return. The higher average return on equities
than on bonds nevertheless reduces the probability of a declining real pay-
out stream from the annuity policy.
In practice, however, variable-annuity policies that oﬀer payouts linked
to equity returns do not guarantee real payouts that rise as steeply as table
9.6 suggests. This is because the payouts on a variable annuity depend on
the performance of the underlying assets relative to the annuity product’s
assumed interest rate (AIR) (R in eq. [3]). Therefore, the variable-annuity
payout for an equity-linked variable annuity can rise over time only if the
equity portfolio returns more than the assumed value of R used in design-
ing the annuity. Bodie and Pesando (1983) assume that R equals the his-
torical average return on the assets that back the annuity in their hypothet-
ical evaluation of variable-payout annuities. In practice, we have found
that nominal R values of 3 or 4 percent per year are common, even for
equity-linked variable-payout annuities, in the current annuity market.
One should note that, if a variable-payout annuity assumed R  0, then
the real payouts in table 9.6 would in fact describe the experience of an
annuitant since the nominal payout recursion would become A(t  1) 
A(t)  (1  zt).
The high average real return on equities implies that an investor holding
U.S. stocks over the last seven decades would have experienced a rising
real-wealth proﬁle. But, to study whether this is because equities provide
a good inﬂation hedge, we must explore the way U.S. equity returns covary
with shocks to the inﬂation rate. If stocks generate positive returns when
the inﬂation rate rises unexpectedly, then equities operate as an inﬂation
hedge. The fact that U.S. equities have generated substantial positive re-
turns over the period since 1926 does not provide any information on the
correlation between inﬂation and stock returns.
We investigate the historical covariances between real U.S. stock re-
turns, bond returns, bill returns, and unexpected inﬂation shocks over two
sample periods: 1926–97 and 1947–97. If the real return on a particular
asset category is not aﬀected by unexpected inﬂation, then that asset can
serve as a valuable inﬂation hedge. If the real return on the asset declines
when inﬂation rises unexpectedly, however, then that asset does not pro-
vide an inﬂation hedge.
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pected inﬂation.” We do this by estimating fourth-order autoregessive
models relating annual inﬂation (t) to its own lagged values or to its own
lagged values as well as those of nominal Treasury-bill rates (it). The basic
regression speciﬁcation is either
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Table 9.7 presents the ﬁndings from estimating (5a) and (5b) for the
two sample periods. Two broad conclusions emerge from the table. First,
there is a great deal of persistence in inﬂation. The sum of the four coeﬃ-
cients on lagged inﬂation for the period 1926–97 is .773, while for the pe-
riod 1947–97 it is .732. There is somewhat greater inﬂation persistence in
the early years of the sample than in the postwar period. We experimented
with extending the length of the lag polynomials in (5a) and (5b). While
the fourth-order inﬂation lag in both equations shows a coeﬃcient that
is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, higher lagged values were
never statistically signiﬁcant.
Second, the incremental explanatory power of lagged Treasury-bill
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Table 9.7 Estimates of the Inﬂation Process for the United States, 1930–97
Explanatory Lagged Inﬂation Lagged Inﬂation Lagged Inﬂation Lagged Inﬂation
Variable Only, 1930–97 and Bills, 1930–97 Only, 1947–97 and Bills, 1947–97
Constant .008 .010 .009 .005
(.005) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Inﬂation (t  1) .706 .666 .647 .566
(.113) (.124) (.100) (.106)
Inﬂation (t  2) .146 .086 .161 .127
(.142) (.148) (.119) (.120)
Inﬂation (t  3) .223 .208 .056 .066
(.142) (.146) (.118) (.119)
Inﬂation (t  4) .436 .447 .302 .280
(.112) (.119) (.099) (.103)
Bill yield (t  1) .370 .549
(.340) (.241)
Bill yield (t  2) .694 .677
(.470) (.328)
Bill yield (t  3) .129 .218
(.483) (.338)
Bill yield (t  4) .108 .053
(.338) (.234)
Adjusted R2 .507 .500 .544 .571
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Ibbotson Associates (1998).yields is relatively small after we have controlled for lagged inﬂation. Bill
rates have somewhat greater explanatory power in the postwar period than
in the full sample period. Because most of the estimated coeﬃcients on
bill rates for both sample periods are statistically insigniﬁcant, however,
the unexpected inﬂation series calculated from speciﬁcations (5a) and (5b)
are likely to yield similar estimates of the correlation between unexpected
inﬂation and asset returns.
We estimate unexpected inﬂation (u,t) by computing the residuals from
either (5a) or (5b). These unexpected inﬂation series incorporate some
future information in each case because the coeﬃcients are estimated over
the full sample period. We then use these time series as the explanatory
variables in regression models in which real stock, bond, or bill returns
are the dependent variables:
(6) Rit i u t it =+ ⋅ +  , . ε
Table 9.8 shows the coeﬃcient estimates for i from regression models
estimated for the two sample periods.
The results provide no evidence to suggest that stocks or bonds have
been inﬂation hedges during the last seventy years. For both these asset
categories, a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of unexpected inﬂation
is associated with a decline of more than 1 percent in bond and in stock
values. The estimated negative eﬀects are larger, although somewhat less
precisely estimated, for the period 1947–97 than for the longer sample. As
noted above, the two unexpected inﬂation series, one corresponding to a
lagged-inﬂation-only predicting equation, the other corresponding to the
augmented speciﬁcation with lagged Treasury-bill returns as well, produce
very similar results when they are included on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (6).
Table 9.8 Unexpected Inﬂation and Real Asset Returns, United States,
1926–97
1930–97 Sample 1947–97 Sample
Inﬂation Process Bills Bonds Stocks Bills Bonds Stocks
Bills and inﬂation 0.827 1.702 1.582 0.580 3.442 4.326
(0.137) (0.389) (0.804) (0.174) (0.650) (1.077)
Inﬂation only 0.864 1.672 1.560 0.387 2.515 4.271
(0.128) (0.378) (0.783) (0.170) (0.664) (0.975)
5-year nonoverlapping 0.191 1.522 1.969
returns, inﬂation only (0.437) (0.657) (0.670)
Note: Each entry corresponds to the coeﬃcient i in the regression equation
Rit  i  u,t & it,
where Rit denotes the real return on asset i in period t, and u,t denotes the unexpected inﬂation rate.
Estimates are based on authors’ analysis of data in Ibbotson Associates (1998), as described in the text.
342 Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, and James M. PoterbaWe also ﬁnd evidence that unexpected inﬂation reduces real Treasury-
bill returns. The eﬀect on these returns is more muted than that on bond
and stock returns, and, for both sample periods, we ﬁnd that a 1 percent-
age point increase in unexpected inﬂation reduces the real return on Trea-
sury bills by less than 1 percentage point. Nevertheless, for both sample
periods, we reject the null hypothesis that real Treasury-bill returns are
unaﬀected by inﬂation surprises.
The ﬁnding that unexpected inﬂation is negatively correlated with real
asset returns is broadly consistent with previous research. For example,
Barr and Campbell (1996) show that the real interest rate on U.K. indexed
bonds appears to covary negatively with inﬂation. Evans (1998) surveys a
number of other empirical papers, using data from several nations and
various methodologies, all of which reach similar conclusions. Our ﬁnd-
ings for equities are consistent with Bodie (1976), who suggested that us-
ing equities to hedge inﬂation risk requires a short position in equities.
One question that some might raise about the results presented in table
9.8 concerns the focus on one-year return horizons. It is possible that the
high-frequency correlation between unexpected inﬂation and asset returns
diﬀers from the lower-frequency correlation. Boudoukh and Richardson
(1993) present some evidence for both the United States and the United
Kingdom suggesting that the nominal return on corporate equities moves
together with inﬂation at long horizons. To explore this issue, we repeated
our analysis using real returns and unexpected inﬂation over ﬁve-year in-
tervals. We conﬁned our analysis to the sample period 1926–97 and used
an AR(2) model to construct an estimate of unexpected inﬂation. We fo-
cused on nonoverlapping ﬁve-year intervals, which provided twelve obser-
vations for estimating equation (6). The last row of table 9.8 presents the
results. They continue to show a negative correlation between real stock
and bond returns and unexpected inﬂation. The only change relative to
the previous ﬁndings is that unexpected inﬂation no longer has a negative
eﬀect on real Treasury-bill returns.
Our empirical results therefore suggest that the inﬂation-hedging prop-
erties of equities and long-term bonds are limited. Nevertheless, as Siegel
(1998) and others have noted, over long horizons, equities have typically
generated very substantial positive real returns. This appears to be the
result of a high average real return on equities rather than a positive cor-
relation between equity returns and unexpected inﬂation. A substantial
body of research has tried to explain the high average return on equities
in the United States during the last century as a function of the correlation
between equity returns and various risk factors. This has proved diﬃcult
and has become known as the “equity-premium puzzle.”
The weak high-frequency correlation between equity returns and inﬂa-
tion is a challenge to many traditional models of asset pricing since equi-
ties represent a claim on real assets that hold their value in real terms.
Prior studies have suggested a number of potential explanations for the
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Feldstein (1980) focused on the interaction of inﬂation and corporate tax
rules, while Modigliani and Cohn (1979) emphasized inﬂation illusion
among equity investors. We are not aware of any empirical evidence that
provides clear guidance for choosing among these explanations.
9.4 Evaluating the Utility Gains from Access to Real Annuities
We have not yet considered how valuable inﬂation protection might be
for a retiree seeking to annuitize his retirement resources. We now address
this issue by estimating a potential annuitant’s “annuity equivalent
wealth” from access to real, nominal, and equity-linked variable-payout
annuities. We focus on equity-linked variable annuities because equities
have historically earned higher expected returns than other assets and be-
cause the ﬁndings presented above showed that, while bills oﬀer some in-
ﬂation protection, their expected return has historically been very small.
Bonds oﬀer limited inﬂation protection and substantially lower average
returns, at least historically, than stocks.
The annuity-valuation framework employed is closely related to that
developed in Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) and MPWB (1999). These two
studies examine the utility gain that a representative individual receives
from access to actuarially fair annuity markets. Brown (1999) provides
empirical evidence suggesting that this framework has predictive value for
explaining whether individuals plan to annuitize the balance that they ac-
cumulate in a deﬁned-contribution plan. In this section, we compare the
utility gains associated with access to diﬀerent types of annuities. Our
ﬁndings provide some guidance on the value to retirees of real versus nom-
inal annuities.
9.4.1 Analytic Framework for Evaluating Alternative Annuities
Our basic algorithm estimates the utility gains accruing to someone
with no annuity who is oﬀered a ﬁxed, nominal annuity on actuarially fair
terms, a real annuity on fair terms, and an equity-linked variable annuity.
To illustrate our procedure, we explain how we calculate an individual’s
“annuity equivalent wealth” when this individual is oﬀered access to a
ﬁxed nominal annuity. We assume that this individual purchases such an
annuity at age sixty-ﬁve, which we normalize to be “year 0.” This individ-
ual receives an annuity payment in each year that he remains alive, and
his optimal consumption path will be related to this payout. The annuity
payout at age a (Aa) depends on wealth at the beginning of retirement
(Wret), potentially on the value of the assets underlying the annuity when
the annuitant is age a, and on the annual annuity payout per dollar of
premium payment (). In the case of a ﬁxed nominal annuity, the nominal
value of Aa is independent of age: Aa Wret. For simplicity, we do not
consider the taxes paid on annuity payouts or the taxes on the returns to
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annuity products are not sensitive to the inclusion of tax rules.
To ﬁnd the actuarially fair ratio of nominal annuity payouts to premium
cost, , for a sixty-ﬁve-year-old male in 1995, we use the Social Security
Administration’s cohort life table for men born in 1930. We deﬁne actuar-
ial fairness as equality of the premium cost and the EPDV of annuity pay-
outs. This deﬁnition ignores the potentially important role of administra-
tive expenses that are incurred by the insurance company oﬀering the
annuity, so it is likely to overstate the payouts that would be available in
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In this expression, Pj denotes the probability of a sixty-ﬁve-year-old retiree
remaining alive j years after retirement, r denotes the annual real interest
rate, and  is the annual inﬂation rate. For computational simplicity, we
use years rather than months in our annuity valuation and continue to as-
sume that no one survives beyond age 115, so P50  0.
After ﬁnding the actuarially fair payout value, we compute the expected
discounted value of lifetime utility that would be associated with the con-
sumption stream generated by this nominal annuity. To do this, we assume









































For this functional form, the parameter  is the individual’s coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion. This parameter also determines the degree of inter-
temporal substitution in consumption. The nominal consumption ﬂow
(Cj) is deﬂated by the price index (1  ) j.
We consider a ﬁrst case in which our sixty-ﬁve-year-old uses all his re-
sources to purchase an annuity contract and a second case in which he
purchases an annuity with half his resources. In the second case, we as-
sume that the other half of the individual’s resources is invested in a real
annuity. This case can be thought of as describing the retiree’s choice prob-
lem when he has both an individual account balance that can be annui-
tized and a substantial real retirement annuity like that oﬀered by the
current social security system. As explained by Hurd (1987) and MPWB
(1999), the marginal value of an increase in annuitization is greater when
fewer resources are already annuitized.
We assume that the retiree has wealth at age sixty-ﬁve of Wret, and,
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no preexisting annuity wealth. We ﬁnd the optimal consumption path for
someone who receives a nominal annuity of Wret per period. For such an
individual, the budget constraint at each age a is given by
(9) ret WW W C r aa a + =+ −⋅ ++ 1 11 () [ ( ) ( ) ] . 
This speciﬁcation makes the standard assumption that nominal interest
rates rise point for point with inﬂation even though our previous results
call this assumption into question. The retiree with budget constraint (9)
also faces an initial condition on wealth after purchasing the annuity:
W0  0. It is possible that the retiree will save some of the payouts from
the annuity contract, and thereby accumulate wealth, in the early years
of retirement.
Equation (9) assumes that the investment opportunity set for the retiree
consists of a nominal bond that oﬀers a ﬁxed real return r. The utility
gains from purchasing an annuity are likely to depend on the set of portfo-
lio options that investors have outside their annuity contract. Campbell
and Viceira (1998) present some evidence on the optimal structure of port-
folios at diﬀerent points in the life cycle for investors who have access to
nominal and real bonds. Extending our framework to allow for more real-
istic portfolio structure is a natural direction for further work.
We compute the retiree’s lifetime expected utility by solving for his opti-
mal consumption path {Ca} using stochastic dynamic programming,
where the stochastic component of the problem arises from uncertainty
regarding date of death. The result is lifetime expected utility as a function
of wealth at retirement, U*  U*(Wret), for the case in which the retiree
has access to a nominal annuity contract.
When the retiree does not have access to an annuity market, his problem
is to maximize the utility function (8) subject to the budget constraint and
initial condition:
(10a) WW C r aa a + =−⋅ ++ 1 11 () [ ( ) ( ) ] 
and
(10b) ret WW 0 = .
The optimal consumption path in this case yields a value of lifetime ex-
pectedutility,againasafunctionofwealthatretirement,U**U**(Wret),
for a retiree with no access to an annuity market.
The annuity-equivalent wealth is the amount of wealth that a retiree
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lifetime utility level that he can attain with access to an annuity mar-
ket. We assume full annuitization when the annuity market is available.
We note in passing that, in some cases, full annuitization does not yield
the highest possible level of lifetime expected utility. Hurd (1987, 1989)
shows that some individuals can be overannuitized when their optimal
consumption path is constrained by the annuity-income ﬂow. This could
happen to individuals with high discount rates relative to the interest rate.
Nevertheless, our calculations compare full annuitization with no annuiti-
zation.
Formally, annuity-equivalent wealth Waew satisﬁes the equation
(11) aew ret UW U W **( ) *( ). =
We use a numerical search algorithm to ﬁnd the value of Waew that satisﬁes
this equation. Since the longevity insurance associated with an annuity
makes the individual better oﬀ, Waew  Wret. The retiree requires more
wealth to achieve a given retirement utility level when he does not have
access to a nominal annuity market than when he does.
When we report the annuity-equivalent wealth in our results below, we
normalize Waew by Wret, and we report Waew/Wret. This makes our calcula-
tions directly comparable to those in Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981). Our
annuity-equivalent-wealth calculations diﬀer, however, from MPWB’s
(1999) estimates of the amount of wealth that individuals would be pre-
pared to give up in order to invest their remaining wealth in actuarially
fair annuities. In MPWB (1999), the central focus is on the divergence
between the EPDV of annuity payouts and the purchase price of annuity
contracts. Because the EPDV is less than the purchase price, the natural
question to ask is what fraction of their wealth individuals would ratio-
nally forgo in order to obtain an annuity.
In the present paper, we follow Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak (1981) in asking
how much additional wealth an individual would need to be as well oﬀ
without access to an annuity market as with it. Our choice of this ap-
proach, rather than the wealth-equivalent approach of MPWB (1999), was
largely motivated by computational concerns. In the present setting, we
search for Waew in a relatively simple problem, where the only source of
uncertainty is mortality risk. Real interest rates are certain in our bench-
mark case with the budget constraint in (10a). If we used either the nomi-
nal or the variable-annuity cases as our benchmark, we would need to
search for Waew in a problem that includes both mortality risk and inﬂation
risk. This substantially slowed our numerical solution algorithm.
In simple environments without any preexisting annuities, the annuity-
The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an IA Program 347equivalent wealth (AEW) that we report is simply a transformation of the
wealth-equivalent (WE) measure in MPWB (1999): WE  1/AEW. Thus,
if we ﬁnd that a retiree requires 1.5 times as much wealth to achieve a
given utility level without access to nominal annuities as with them, we
could also interpret this as implying that the retiree would be prepared to
give up 33 percent of his wealth (.50/1.5) if he did not have a nominal
annuity in order to obtain access to one. When the retiree has some preex-
isting annuity wealth, however, the relation becomes more complex, and
this relation holds approximately but not exactly.
Our analysis of the annuity-equivalent wealth for a nominal annuity
generalizes immediately to the case of a real annuity or a variable-payout
annuity. For an actuarially fair real annuity, we determine the annual pay-













This expression is analogous to (7), but the discount factor involves only
real interest rates, and the numerator involves only real payouts. As in the
discussion above, we ﬁnd the optimal consumption proﬁle for a consumer
who purchases such an annuity, and we then ﬁnd the annuity-equivalent
wealth associated with access to a real annuity.
We also consider the utility consequences of being able to purchase
variable-payout annuity products, in particular the case in which annuity
payouts are indexed to an underlying portfolio of common stocks. To
compute the actuarially fair payout on such variable annuities, we assume
that a risk-neutral insurance company oﬀers a variable annuity with an













In this expression, R is the AIR for the variable-annuity product. The
payout in the ﬁrst period of the annuity purchase is therefore
(14) ret AW v() . 0 = ′′ ⋅ 
The nominal payout on the variable annuity is determined in subsequent
periods by the recursion
(15) At At z R vv () ( ) () / ( ) , += ⋅+ + 11 1
where z denotes the nominal return on the equity portfolio.
In considering the equity-linked variable annuity, it is essential to recog-
nize that the initial payout on the annuity policy is increasing in the AIR.
The appeal of the equity-linked variable annuity arises from this higher
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assets invested in the variable annuity.
9.4.2 Calibration of Annuity-Equivalent Wealth
To carry out the annuity-equivalent-wealth calculations described in the
previous subsection, we must calibrate the lifetime-utility function, the
survival probability distribution, and the distributions for inﬂation and
real returns on the assets that might be held in portfolios backing variable-
payout annuities. All results will assume that the utility discount rate  is
equal to the riskless interest rate r.
Risk Aversion
The parameter  in equation (8) represents the household’s degree of
risk aversion and its willingness to engage in intertemporal substitution in
consumption. This risk-aversion parameter is an important determinant
of the gains from annuitization when the real value of annuity payouts in
future periods is uncertain because of stochastic asset returns or stochas-
tic inﬂation.
Most empirical studies that attempt to estimate a value of relative risk
aversion from household consumption patterns ﬁnd values close to unity,
which corresponds to log utility. Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (1998)
summarize this literature. Mehra and Prescott (1985), however, note that
much higher levels of risk aversion are required to rationalize the presence
of the large premium of corporate equity returns over riskless-bond re-
turns in historical U.S. data. It is diﬃcult to reconcile the empirical evi-
dence of low risk aversion and the existence of the large historical equity
premium. Recent work based on survey questions about household toler-
ance of risk, reported in Barsky et al. (1997), also suggests values higher
than unity. In the light of this dispersion of ﬁndings, we present calcula-
tions using risk-aversion coeﬃcients of 1, 2, 5, and 10. In their related
study of the utility gains from annuitization, Baxter and King (chap. 10 in
this volume) consider an even wider range of risk-aversion values, ranging
from 2 to 25. We are inclined to place the most emphasis on our ﬁndings
with risk-aversion coeﬃcients between 1 and 5, but we present ﬁndings
using 10 to provide evidence on the robustness of our ﬁndings.
Survival Probabilities
The mortality process that we use in our analysis corresponds to the
population mortality table supplied by the Social Security Administration.
We use a cohort life table with projected future mortality rates since we
are interested in an annuity purchased by someone who is currently of re-
tirement age. We use a 1930 birth cohort table to study a sixty-ﬁve-year-
old male, so our calculations eﬀectively describe someone who was consid-
ering purchasing an annuity in 1995.
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We use historical data from the period 1926–97 to calibrate the stochas-
tic process for inﬂation. The average value of inﬂation over this period is
3.2 percent per year. We assume that the inﬂation rate in each “year” takes
one of six values: 10.2, 1.44, 1.75, 3.82, 9.06, or 18.2 percent. The
respective probabilities of these inﬂation outcomes are assumed to be .01,
.19, .3, .3, .19, and .01. These inﬂation values correspond approximately
to the ﬁrst, tenth, thirty-ﬁfth, sixty-ﬁfth, ninetieth, and ninetieth-ninth
percentiles of the annual inﬂation distribution for the years 1926–97, and
they imply an average annual inﬂation rate of 3.2 percent. We have de-
voted special attention to the extreme tails of the inﬂation distribution to
make sure that our analysis captures the possibility of a very high inﬂation
period since we might otherwise overstate the value of an annuity that is
ﬁxed in nominal terms.
We consider two cases for the inﬂation process, corresponding to
diﬀerent assumptions about the degree of inﬂation persistence over time.
The ﬁrst case treats each annual inﬂation rate as an independent draw
from our six-point distribution. This approach to modeling inﬂation tends
to understate the long-run variance of the real value of ﬁxed nominal pay-
ments and thus serves as a lower bound on the eﬀect of inﬂation. Our
empirical ﬁndings in the last section demonstrate clearly that inﬂation is
a highly persistent process.
In the second case, we incorporate persistence by allowing inﬂation to
follow a stylized AR(1) process. In the ﬁrst period, inﬂation is drawn from
the same six-point distribution as in the i.i.d. scenario. In later periods,
however, there is a probability 
 that t1 will be equal to t and a proba-
bility 1 
of taking a new draw from the six-point distribution. An
attractive feature of this approach is that 
 is equal to the AR(1) coeﬃ-
cient in a regression of inﬂation on its one-period lagged value, and thus

 can be parameterized using historical inﬂation data. Using U.S. histori-
cal data from the period 1926–97, the AR(1) coeﬃcient for inﬂation is
equal to 0.64, and this is the value of 
 that we use in modeling a persistent
inﬂation process.
The beneﬁt of avoiding the inﬂation risk is shown by comparisons be-
tween our annuity-equivalent-wealth values when retirees have access to
actuarially fair nominal annuity markets and actuarially fair real annuity
markets. Our measure is related to, but not equivalent to, Bodie’s (1990)
analysis of the value of inﬂation insurance as the cost of purchasing a call
option on the consumer price index. His approach generates the cost of
producing an inﬂation-indexed income stream, while our approach focuses
on the consumer valuation of such an income stream.
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Our analysis assumes that investors have access to riskless real returns
of 3 percent per year (r  .03). While this return is higher than the average
return on “riskless” Treasury bills over the period 1926–97, it is lower than
the current return on long-term TIPS. We think of TIPS as the riskless
asset with respect to retirement saving and therefore use a higher return
than the historical real return on Treasury bills. We further assume that
inﬂation raises the nominal return on this riskless asset so that the real
return is unaﬀected by inﬂation. This is tantamount to assuming that the
investor is holding an indexed real bond.
When we consider variable annuity products backed by portfolios of
risky securities, we must specify both the mean return associated with
these securities and the variability of returns around this mean. Higher
mean returns on the portfolios that back variable-payout annuities will
make these products more attractive to potential annuitants, while greater
risk will reduce their attractiveness.
We consider a variable-payout annuity backed by a broad portfolio of
common stocks. Table 9.9 presents historical information on real returns
and the standard deviation of real returns for U.S. stocks, bills, and bonds
over the period 1926–97. This table is another way of presenting the infor-
mation in table 9.6 above on real returns over diﬀerent horizons. We as-
sume throughout that the standard deviation of real returns on equities
equals its historical average value of 20.9 percent per year.
In computing the annuity-equivalent wealth for an equity-backed vari-
able annuity, we consider two diﬀerent assumptions with regard to the
mean real return on equities. First, we assume a 6 percent real return
(i.e., a 3 percent premium over the indexed-bond return). This assumption
about the equity premium is substantially smaller than the historical aver-
age diﬀerential between stock and bond returns, but it is designed to be
conservative. Second, we consider a case with a 9 percent real return on
equities, which translates to a 6 percent premium above the real bond.
Table 9.9 Mean Real Returns and Standard Deviations of Real Returns,
1926–97 (%)
1926–97 1947–97
Mean Standard Mean Standard
Real Return Deviation Real Return Deviation
Treasury bills 0.73 4.17 0.87 2.64
Long-term Treasury bonds 2.57 10.53 2.01 11.13
Equities 9.66 20.46 9.93 16.95
Source: Authors’ tabulations using data from Ibbotson Associates (1998).
The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an IA Program 351This is still a smaller equity premium than historical returns suggest, but
it yields a real return on equities close to the historical average. The extent
to which historical real returns on corporate stock provide guidance on
prospective returns is an open issue (for divergent views, see Campbell
and Shiller [1998] and Siegel [1998]). In both cases, we assume an AIR on
the variable annuity equal to the expected return on the underlying portfo-
lio, following the approach of Bodie and Pesando (1983).
In order to account for the variability in returns, we again use a discrete
six-point approximation to capture the distribution of real equity returns.
Speciﬁcally, we constructed a distribution of the equity excess return over
the period 1926–97. By subtracting oﬀ the mean excess return and then
adding in our assumed 6 or 9 percent mean return, we constructed our
distribution of equity returns. This approach allows us to alter our as-
sumption about the mean equity premium over the riskless rate while
holding the variance of equity returns at historical levels. We pick points
from the ﬁrst, tenth, thirty-ﬁfth, sixty-ﬁfth, ninetieth, and ninety-ninth
percentiles of the distribution and use the probabilities .01, .19, .3, .3, .19,
a n d. 0 1f o rt h e s ed r a w s .F o rt h ec a s eo fa6p e r c e n tm e a nr e a lr eturn, the
corresponding points in the return distribution are .475, .182, .036,
.156, .306, and .506. For the case ofa9p e r c e n tm e a nr e a lr eturn, the
entire distribution of returns is shifted up by .03. Real equity returns are
modeled as independent across time. This does not allow for any possible
variance compression at long horizons.
9.4.3 Results on the Valuation of Real versus Nominal Annuities
Table 9.10 reports our estimates of the annuity-equivalent wealth for
real and nominal annuities. The ﬁrst three columns report results for the
case with no preannuitized wealth, when the potential annuitant places all
his wealth in an annuity. Columns 4–6 explore the case in which the po-
tential annuitant already holds half his net worth in a real annuity such
as social security. To interpret the results, ﬁrst consider the case in which
the potential annuitant has a logarithmic utility function (CRRA  1).In
this case, the annuity-equivalent wealth is 1.502 for a ﬁxed real annuity.
This implies that an individual would be indiﬀerent between having $1 in
a real annuity or $1.50 in nonannuitized wealth. Note that the annuity-
equivalent wealth for this individual is 1.451 in the case of i.i.d. inﬂation
and 1.424 in the case of persistent inﬂation. These results suggest that a
real annuity is more valuable than a nominal annuity and more so when
the inﬂation process is more persistent.
For a real annuity, the annuity-equivalent wealth is monotonically in-
creasing with the level of risk aversion. When the CRRA coeﬃcient is 10,
for example, the annuity-equivalent wealth rises to 2.004, meaning that an
individual is indiﬀerent between $2 of nonannuitized wealth and $1 in
wealth that can be invested in a real annuity. For ﬁxed nominal annuities
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annuity-equivalent wealth and the level of risk aversion does not hold.
This is because there are two eﬀects of risk aversion that work in opposite
directions in the case of inﬂation uncertainty. The ﬁrst is that higher risk
aversion leads one to value an annuitized payout more highly because the
annuity eliminates the risk of outliving one’s resources. This is the only
eﬀect present when examining real annuity products. The second factor,
which works in the opposite direction, is that more risk-averse individuals
have a greater dislike for the uncertainty introduced into the real annuity
stream by stochastic inﬂation. Increased variability in the real value of the
annuity ﬂows reduces utility, and this eﬀect is largest for those with the
highest degree of risk aversion.
At low levels of risk aversion, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates, and the annuity-
equivalent wealth for ﬁxed nominal annuities is rising with risk aversion.
For example, moving from CRRA  1 to CRRA  2, the annuity-
equivalent wealth increases from 1.451 to 1.553 in the i.i.d.-inﬂation case
and from 1.424 to 1.501 in the persistent-inﬂation case. However, as risk
aversion increases further, the second eﬀect becomes stronger, and the
annuity-equivalent wealth begins to decrease with risk aversion.
The annuity-equivalent wealth values described above provide informa-
tion on the amount of incremental wealth that individuals would require
to be made as well oﬀ as if they had access to annuities, assuming that they
have no preexisting annuity coverage. The diﬀerence between the annuity-
equivalent-wealth values for real and nominal annuities provides informa-
tion on how valuable a real annuity is relative to a nominal annuity. For
example, to achieve a given utility target in a world with i.i.d. inﬂation, a
nominal annuity is worth 5.1 percent of wealth less than a real annuity
Table 9.10 Annuity-Equivalent Wealth for Real and Nominal Annuities
Individual with No Preexisting Individual with Half of Initial Wealth
Annuity Wealth in Preexisting Real Annuity
Nominal Nominal Nominal Nominal
Coeﬃcient of Annuity: Annuity: Annuity: Annuity:
Relative Risk Real i.i.d. Persistent Real i.i.d. Persistent
Aversion Annuity Inﬂation Inﬂation Annuity Inﬂation Inﬂation
1 1.502 1.451 1.424 1.330 1.304 1.286
2 1.650 1.553 1.501 1.441 1.403 1.366
5 1.855 1.616 1.487 1.623 1.515 1.450
10 2.004 1.592 1.346 1.815 1.577 1.451
Source: Authors’ calculations. The annuity-equivalent wealth for the nominal annuity is calculated
under the assumption that inﬂation takes one of six possible values, roughly capturing the distribution
of inﬂation outcomes over the period 1926–97. Inﬂation shocks are independent across periods in the
i.i.d. case and follow a stylized AR(1) process in the persistent-inﬂation case. For further discussion,
see the text.
The Role of Real Annuities and Indexed Bonds in an IA Program 353(1.502  1.451). At higher risk-aversion levels, the diﬀerential between
real and nominal annuities rises even further. When CRRA  5 and inﬂa-
tion is i.i.d., the nominal annuity is worth 23.9 percent of wealth less than
the real annuity. In the case that is most unfavorable to nominal annuities,
that of persistent inﬂation and a risk-aversion coeﬃcient of 10, access to
a real annuity is equivalent to doubling one’s initial wealth, while access
to a nominal annuity is equivalent to only a one-third increase in wealth.
The results are attenuated when we consider the annuitization decision
of an individual who already holds a substantial amount of his wealth in
a preexisting real annuity. Such a potential annuitant would require a
smaller increment to wealth to achieve the same utility level—without
access to a private annuity market—that he could obtain with such access.
For example, a consumer with a risk-aversion coeﬃcient of unity would
require only a 33 percent increment to his wealth to be made as well oﬀ
as if he had a real annuity, compared to 50 percent in the case when no
wealth was previously annuitized. The presence of a preexisting real annu-
ity oﬀers the potential annuitant some insurance against very low con-
sumption values. This accounts for the diminished value of an additional
privately purchased annuity.
When the annuity option is a nominal rather than a real annuity, the
eﬀect of having a preexisting real annuity is more complex. When inﬂation
draws are independent across years, the results are similar to those for real
annuities: the annuity-equivalent wealth from annuitization declines when
there is a preexisting real annuity. When we allow for a persistent-inﬂation
process, however, along with very high values of risk aversion, the results
change. For example, when CRRA  10, the annuity-equivalent wealth is
higher when the potential annuitant has preannuitized wealth than when
he does not. This is because we have assumed that the preexisting annuity
is a ﬁxed real annuity, which provides insurance against the annuitant ever
experiencing very low values of real income and therefore consumption.
Thus, the utility cost of having high and persistent inﬂation erode the
value of a nominal annuity is reduced, and the potential annuitant’s will-
ingness to purchase a nominal annuity rises.
9.4.4 Results on the Valuation of Variable Annuities
Table 9.11 reports our ﬁndings for the case of equity-linked variable-
payout annuities. We assume that the AIR for such annuities corresponds
to the average real equity return that is built into our calculations. Once
again, we report two panels, corresponding to diﬀerent degrees of preex-
isting annuitization. The ﬁrst column reports results when the average re-
turn on equities exceeds that on bonds by 3 percent, so the real return on
equities averages 6 percent. For an individual with logarithmic utility in
this return environment, an equity-linked variable-payout annuity gener-
ates a higher utility level than a real annuity does. In the case of no preex-
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1.623, is higher than that for the real annuity in table 9.10 above (1.502).
For higher levels of risk aversion, however, a variable annuity with a mean
return of 6 percent is worth less than a real annuity. In fact, an individual
placing 100 percent of his wealth in a variable annuity can actually be
made worse oﬀ than he would be if not annuitizing at all when his degree
of risk aversion is high enough and the equity distribution is highly uncer-
tain. This is indicated by annuity-equivalent wealth values below unity.
The lower panel of table 9.11 reports the ratio of the annuity-equivalent
wealth with an equity-linked variable annuity to that with a real annuity.
When these entries are greater than one, a potential annuitant would pre-
fer a variable annuity to a ﬁxed real annuity. When the entry is less than
one, the individual would be better oﬀ in a real annuity. In the case of
log utility, the individual always prefers an equity-linked variable-annuity
product. At higher risk-aversion levels, however, the ﬁxed real annuity
usually dominates. The same pattern is evident when we allow a higher
real return on equities. For three of the eight combinations of risk aversion
and real equity returns that we considered, a potential annuitant who was
preparing to annuitize all his wealth would prefer the variable to the real
annuity. For ﬁve of the eight combinations, this outcome also emerges in
Table 9.11 Annuity-Equivalent Wealth for Equity-Linked Variable-
Annuity Products
Preexisting Real Annuity
Coeﬃcient Equal to Half of Initial Wealth No Preexisting Annuities
of Relative
Risk Real Stock Real Stock Real Stock Real Stock
Aversion Return 6% Return 9% Return 6% Return 9%
Annuity-Equivalent Wealth
1 1.623 2.024 1.567 1.953
2 1.499 1.901 1.570 1.957
5 0.921 1.355 1.443 1.789
10 0.331 0.622 1.261 1.563
Annuity-Equivalent Wealth Ratio, Variable Annuity/Real Annuity
1 1.081 1.348 1.178 1.468
2 0.908 1.152 1.090 1.358
5 0.496 0.730 0.889 1.102
10 0.165 0.310 0.695 0.861
Source: Authors’ calculations, as described in the text. The calculations in the bottom panel
show the ratio of the annuity-equivalent wealth from the upper panel to the analogous annu-
ity-equivalent wealth from holding a real annuity with an assumed real return of 3 percent.
The underlying annuity-equivalent wealth values for the real annuity case are shown in table
9.10, cols. 1 and 4, above. A ratio greater that one indicates that the variable annuity is
more valuable than a real annuity. Ratios less than one indicate that the real annuity is
more valuable.
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more attractive with preexisting real annuities than without. This is again
because the preexisting real annuity provides a minimum consumption
ﬂoor below which the annuitant will not fall. Therefore, the risk of a very
low consumption state resulting from a series of negative equity returns
is reduced.
These ﬁndings suggest that, for rates of risk aversion commonly cited in
the consumption literature, and for plausible rate-of-return assumptions,
potential annuitants would often prefer to purchase variable annuities
with payouts linked to equity returns rather than real annuities oﬀering
constant purchasing power throughout the annuity period. Even when the
expected real return on stocks is only 3 percent, the extra return aﬀorded
by the variable annuity more than compensates potential annuitants for
the inﬂation risk that they bear. This is particularly evident when the annu-
itant is already endowed with a real annuity that represents a substantial
share of net wealth because, in that case, the risk of very low consumption
as a result of adverse variable-annuity returns is mitigated.
Our results on variable annuities are probably sensitive to our restric-
tion of the menu of assets that investors can hold outside the variable annu-
ity: we do not allow investments in corporate stock except through the
variable-annuity channel. Exploring the robustness of our ﬁndings to re-
laxation of this constraint is an important topic for future work.
9.5 Conclusions and Further Directions
We have provided new evidence on the functioning of existing real an-
nuity markets and on the potential role of nominal, real, and variable-
payout annuities in providing income security to retirees. Three conclu-
sions emerge from the analysis.
First, private insurers can and do oﬀer real annuities to potential annu-
itants. Although at present there is virtually no U.S. market for real annu-
ity products, in the United Kingdom indexed government bonds have
been available for nearly two decades, and, there, indexed annuities are
widely available. From the standpoint of an annuity purchaser, the cost of
purchasing a real rather than a nominal annuity in the United Kingdom
is at most 5 percent of the annuity principal.
Second, real returns on a broad-based portfolio of U.S. stocks have his-
torically outpaced inﬂation by a substantial margin. While extrapolating
from historical returns must be done with caution, the past returns suggest
that there may be beneﬁts for retirees from investing part of their annuity
wealth in a variable-annuity product with returns linked to the returns
on corporate stock. Nevertheless, our analysis of the correlation between
unexpected inﬂation and equity returns suggests that the appeal of an
equity-linked variable annuity is primarily the result of the equity pre-
mium rather than a strong positive correlation between inﬂation shocks
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pear to oﬀer an inﬂation hedge.
Third, consumers place a modest value on access to real rather than
nominal annuities. We consider our results for retirees with a coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion of two as a “benchmark” case. We ﬁnd that, if a
potential annuitant could not purchase a nominal annuity, he would need
roughly 1.5 times as much wealth to achieve the same lifetime utility level
that he could obtain with his given wealth and access to a nominal annuity.
He would need 1.65 times as much wealth to achieve the utility level that
he could obtain if he had access to a real annuity market. These two ﬁnd-
ings can be combined to suggest that a retiree with access to a real annuity
who loses such access would be made worse oﬀ by approximately the same
amount as he would be if he lost 10 percent of his wealth. Consumers
also value access to variable-payout equity-linked annuities, although their
demand for such products is quite sensitive to their degree of risk aversion.
For moderately risk-averse consumers, with coeﬃcients of relative risk
aversion of 2 or less, the annuity-equivalent wealth for an equity-linked
variable annuity may be greater than that for a real annuity. This ﬁnding
obtains even when we assume that the average annual real return on equi-
ties is only three hundred basis points higher than the real return on risk-
less bonds.
These ﬁndings bear on two concerns that are raised in connection with
social security reform plans that include individual accounts. One is that
insurers might not be able to bring to market products providing inﬂation
and longevity protection. Our evidence suggests that this is, in fact, not
a concern in the two countries that we have examined. Both have
government-issued inﬂation-indexed bonds that can be used to back pri-
vate inﬂation-indexed annuities.
A second concern is that, given a choice, retirees might use their individ-
ual account funds to purchase nominal rather than inﬂation-indexed an-
nuities. This is perceived as a problem to the extent that it exposes retirees
to the risk of consumption losses in old age. Our model suggests that the
expected utility losses associated with the purchase of a nominal rather
than a real annuity are modest. It also implies that consumer demand
for inﬂation-linked annuities in an individual accounts system would be
positive, although the extent to which our stylized model describes actual
consumer behavior is an open issue. The demand for real annuities is
greatest among the most risk-averse consumers. It is also increasing in
the degree of persistence of inﬂation shocks. When inﬂation is serially in-
dependent, the annuity-equivalent wealth for a nominal annuity is higher
than when inﬂation is highly persistent. This is because, conditional on the
average inﬂation rate, the risk of experiencing high and persistent inﬂation
poses a greater threat to real retirement consumption than the risk of a
shorter-lived period of high inﬂation.
The demand for real annuities also tends to be lower for households
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any remaining real deﬁned-beneﬁt promises oﬀered to retirees under a
restructured social security system. We estimate that the annuity equiva-
lent wealth of a real annuity is about 5–8 percent less for a consumer
holding half his wealth in social security than for one having no real annu-
ity at all. Moore and Mitchell (2000) show that older Americans currently
hold close to half their retirement wealth in real social security annuities.
This may explain the limited current demand for real annuity products in
the United States. If the social security system were changed in a way that
reduced the importance of CPI-indexed real annuity payouts, the demand
for privately provided annuity products might increase substantially.
Our examination of the interplay between annuity choice, inﬂation pro-
tection, and portfolio risks raises a number of issues that could produc-
tively be explored in future work. One pertains to the use of more complex
annuity products than the ones considered here. We have not investigated
“graded nominal payout products,” discussed by Biggs (1969) and King
(1995). While graded policies do not oﬀer inﬂation protection per se, they
do provide annuitants with an opportunity to backload their real annuity
payouts. Annuity-equivalent wealth values from annuitization in graded
policies, relative to that for ﬁxed nominal or real annuities, would be
straightforward to calculate in our framework.
A more diﬃcult issue for future research concerns the set of portfolio
options available to the individuals considering annuitization and the ex-
tent to which such households have access to assets other than riskless
bonds. One reason for our result that investors ﬁnd equity-linked annuities
valuable is that our models assume that investors can access the equity
market only by using variable annuities. It may be realistic to assume that
some low-income and low-net-worth households accumulating retirement
resources in an individual accounts system do not hold stock in any other
way. For higher net-worth households with greater ﬁnancial sophistica-
tion, this assumption is less appropriate. Extending the current analysis to
allow for a richer portfolio structure on the part of potential annuitants is
an important direction for further work.
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Comment Mark J. Warshawsky
In this paper, Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (BMP) collect interesting in-
stitutional information and empirical evidence concerning the operation
of, and pricing in, nominal and inﬂation-indexed individual annuity mar-
kets in the United Kingdom and the United States. They also present em-
pirical evidence on the historical correlation of inﬂation and the nominal
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TIAA-CREF.returns on the main U.S. asset classes. Finally, BMP show simulation re-
sults of an expected-utility model estimating the relative beneﬁts of diﬀer-
ent annuity types, including nominal ﬁxed, inﬂation-indexed, and equity-
indexed variable payouts, in two inﬂation regimes—independently distrib-
uted and a persistent process. By presenting in one location diﬀerent types
of information, empirical evidence, and simulation modeling, this paper
is extremely useful, I think, to current policy discussions regarding both
individual account proposals for social security reform and pension-plan
design. The modeling of the inﬂation environment is quite novel and so-
phisticated. My comments follow the ﬂow of the paper, touching on most
of its parts, but will focus mainly on the broad question of the investor
demand for inﬂation indexation in annuity products.
In the ﬁrst section of the paper, BMP assemble a data set based on
August 1998 quotes from brokers in the United Kingdom for “compul-
sory” nominal and inﬂation-indexed individual annuities. They ﬁnd that
the ﬁrst-month payout for the inﬂation-indexed annuities is about 30 per-
cent lower than the payout on the nominal annuity. BMP also ﬁnd that,
while there is substantial variation across insurers in the pricing of all
annuity types, variation is higher in the indexed market. Finally, when
BMP do the now-familiar “money’s-worth” calculation, they ﬁnd that the
expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the payouts from nominal
annuities is about 5 percent higher than the expected value of payouts
from inﬂation-indexed annuities, 90 percent compared to 85 percent. They
also state that these EPDVs are uniformly higher than the EPDVs for
nominal individual annuities in the United States—83.5 percent. BMP
also note that EPDVs decline with issue age.
In explaining the money’s-worth results, BMP cite adverse selection as
a possible explanation; that is, those who expect to live longer will prefer
inﬂation-indexed annuities to nominal annuities (which are of shorter du-
ration), and, as people age, they will have better and more speciﬁc infor-
mation about their own mortality prospects. In addition, in the entirely
voluntary U.S. market, adverse selection will be a greater factor than in the
compulsory U.K. market. This is a nice, coherent story, and it is bolstered
because BMP have calculated their mortality probabilities for the U.K.
population correctly; that is, they are using a cohort table that includes
expected improvements in mortality, as they used in the calculations for
the United States. Mortality improvements will aﬀect the EPDVs of
inﬂation-indexed annuities more than those of nominal annuities. BMP
state that their interpretation would be conﬁrmed if evidence were found
that those who purchase inﬂation-indexed annuities have longer life expec-
tanciesthanthosewhoselectnominalannuities.Itisworthnoting,however,
fromTIAA-CREFmortalityexperiencethatTIAA(ﬁxed)annuitantshave
slightly longer life expectancies than CREF (variable) annuitants, an out-
come that runs somewhat counter to the BMP hypothesis.
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nal as compared to inﬂation-indexed annuities in the United Kingdom
and of U.K. as compared to U.S. annuities, is that there is simply more
volume (i.e., demand) in the U.K. nominal annuity market than in other
market segments and that therefore that market is more competitive and
eﬃcient. The price-variation evidence is consistent with this latter expla-
nation. It is also possible, despite their somewhat breezy assertion that the
availability of such indexed bonds has made it possible for U.K. insurers
to oﬀer real annuity products without bearing inﬂation risk, that U.K.
insurers bear greater risks in oﬀering real as opposed to nominal annuities
and must charge for these risks. In particular, the insurer of a ﬁxed real
annuity must bear the risk of unexpected changes in the real interest rate
and must also bear inﬂation risk for those durations not available in the
bond market or not covered by futures, options, and swap contracts. Also,
because the investments underlying the real annuity market are more pre-
dominantly Treasury than corporate securities, there is an opportunity
cost from the loss of the corporate bond risk and tax premium, which in
the United States runs at almost one hundred basis points.
In the second part of the paper, BMP turn to the nascent U.S. market
for inﬂation-indexed annuities, represented by one company, Irish Life of
North America. They compare the monthly payouts of nominal and
inﬂation-indexed annuities issued by Irish Life in the United States and,
similar to their ﬁnding in the United Kingdom, discover that the ﬁrst
monthly payout from the inﬂation-indexed annuity is 30 percent smaller
than the payout from the nominal annuity. But, unlike their ﬁnding in the
United Kingdom, when BMP do the money’s-worth calculation for the
United States, they ﬁnd that the EPDV for the Irish Life inﬂation-indexed
annuity is much lower (70 percent) than for its nominal annuity (86.5 per-
cent). I would suppose that these ﬁndings, taken together, are explained
by a lower (expected) inﬂation rate in the United States than in the United
Kingdom or a higher real interest rate. Of course, as the only issuer of
inﬂation-indexed annuities in the United States (with no reported issues
to date), Irish Life’s pricing strategy is probably not too inﬂuenced by
concerns about competition and will not beneﬁt much from economies of
scale and scope. In addition, the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial technology and mar-
ket development are not yet available in the United States in the inﬂation-
indexed bond arena; there are no swaps, futures, options, or corporate-
bond issuers yet.
BMP next explain well the CREF inﬂation-linked-bond-account
(ILBA) variable annuity and cite the unique TIAA graded beneﬁt-
payment method. They outline the mechanics of how a variable annuity
works in the payout phase and appropriately note the importance of the
assumed interest rate (AIR), which for all CREF accounts is 4 percent.
In this section of the paper, however, I diﬀer somewhat from BMP’s inter-
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the value of the ILBA is not guaranteed. With the exception of some vola-
tility when the Treasury ﬁrst issued TIPS and recently, however, the unit
value of the ILBA has been quite steady, rising slowly, and is less volatile
than the (nominal) CREF bond account. Figure 9C.1 plots the month-to-
month change over the period May 1997-December 1998 in the unit values
of the inﬂation-indexed and nominal bond accounts. The nominal bond
account shows a higher return but also higher volatility. Also, I would give
a somewhat diﬀerent interpretation of the relative size of the small ILBA
compared to the massive CREF stock account. While it is true that, theo-
retically, when the ILBA was introduced, all CREF participants could
have transferred the entire value of their equity accounts to the ILBA,
participant behavior is not so volatile. A more appropriate volume com-
parison is probably to other newly introduced TIAA-CREF variable ac-
counts; that is done in ﬁgure 9C.2. There, we see that, while ILBA asset
growth has indeed trailed that of other new accounts, its lower return and
lack of investor familiarity probably explain most of the divergence.1
BMP state that the ILBA variable annuity could improve its ability to
deliver an inﬂation-indexed payout stream by having the AIR reﬂect the
expected real interest rate on TIPS, perhaps with a haircut for conserva-
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Fig. 9C.1 Month-to-month percent change in unit value for the CREF inﬂation-
linked bond account and the bond account, May 1997–December 1998
Note: May 1997 data are from inception at 1 May 1997.
1. BMP also comment on the relative expense charges among the CREF accounts. It
should be noted that a smaller share of the expense charge is devoted to investment expenses;
most of the charge is for administrative costs and is equal across all the accounts. Investment
expenses are related to the size of the account as well as to the investment strategy used.tism; in current conditions, this would suggest an AIR of 3.25 or 3.5 per-
cent. This is a good suggestion if the ILBA is viewed in isolation. Except
in the rare cases, however, for most older TIAA-CREF participants, it is
probably more sensible for a typical annuitant to have a mix of ﬁxed,
equity-indexed variable, and inﬂation-indexed payout streams; for such a
mix, a 4 percent AIR overall probably is more logical. Also, states impose
various upper and lower limits on the allowable AIR in a variable annuity,
and, therefore, practical business considerations for an insurer issuing an-
nuities in all ﬁfty states may dictate restrictions on feasible AIRs. Finally,
contrary to the statement in the paper, and as noted above, TIAA and
CREF annuity payouts are priced using two diﬀerent mortality tables.
In the third section of the paper, BMP examine brieﬂy whether the his-
torical performance of bills, bonds, stocks, and inﬂation would lead one
to believe that the correlation of returns and inﬂation could let equities
serve as a replacement for inﬂation-indexed securities. While BMP caveat
their evidence on this score, their ﬁndings are largely negative; equities do
not oﬀer an inﬂation hedge. The historically high return of equities seems
to be explained by the equity premium rather than by a correlation with in-
ﬂation.
In the fourth section of the paper, BMP evaluate the utility gains from,
that is, the willingness to pay for, access to inﬂation-indexed annuities,
nominal ﬁxed annuities, and equity-indexed variable annuities. They uti-
lize an expected-utility model with an additively separable utility function
and mortality, inﬂation, and real-return uncertainty. The model is cali-
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Fig. 9C.2 Net asset growth for new TIAA-CREF accountsbrated at various levels of risk aversion found in the literature, general
population cohort mortality probabilities, and simple uncorrelated six-
point distributions of inﬂation and equity returns related to the historical
record (with some adjustments for conservatism and current market con-
ditions). In a major improvement over the version of the paper presented
at the conference, BMP also model an inﬂation process that is persistent
from one year to the next. Under these assumptions, BMP ﬁnd that, at
median levels of risk aversion, and with a preexisting real annuity (i.e.,
social security), the willingness to pay for inﬂation-indexed annuities is
positive but modest.2 When inﬂation is a persistent process, however, the
(relative) willingness to pay for inﬂation-indexed annuities is signiﬁcantly
larger, particularly for higher levels of risk aversion. By contrast, they ﬁnd
that, for plausible risk aversion and rate-of-return assumptions, a signiﬁ-
cant willingness to pay exists for equity-indexed variable annuities com-
pared to inﬂation-indexed annuities. This result owes to the superior re-
turn on equity investments that more than compensates annuitants for the
investment risk that they bear. In this latter comparison of annuity types,
BMP apparently did not consider the eﬀect of inﬂation uncertainty, of
either the independently distributed or the persistent-process varieties.
There are several real-world complexities that both decrease and in-
crease the importance of inﬂation risk relative to the original BMP model;
on net, I believe, these complexities make inﬂation risk more signiﬁcant
than that portrayed in the model. Historical inﬂation, as measured by the
CPI, may be overstated; this is certainly the conclusion of the Boskin
Commission and seems to be the consensus of the economics profession,
and, indeed, recent actions by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are
tending to lower the reported inﬂation rate. By contrast, the CPI measures
generally used to measure inﬂation may understate the rate of inﬂation
relevant to the elderly population most likely to purchase life annuities;
because of heavier expenditure weights on medical care and housing, the
BLS’s experimental CPI-E index indicates that, since 1988, the elderly
have been exposed to greater inﬂation than the rest of the population.
Most important, in contrast to their original simple several-point distri-
bution model of the annual inﬂation rate, and as they now note, in the
real world, inﬂation has been a persistent process. Once inﬂation gets
started, it is hard to contain, and inﬂation rates tend to ratchet upward.
By contrast, once inﬂation is low, virtuous expectations take hold, and
wage and price pressures are held in check. As shown in table 9C.1, simple
regression analysis where the dependent variable is the quarterly percent-
age change in CPI-U over the period 1950 to the present indicates that
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2. It would be interesting to reconcile the results of the BMP simulation model with evi-
dence on the inﬂation-risk premium extant in the bond market (for a model supporting an
estimate that the inﬂation-risk premium in the United States has been forty-one basis points
in the past several decades, see Hammond, Fairbanks, and Durham [1999]).there is signiﬁcant autocorrelation in inﬂation rates; summing the coeﬃ-
cients on lagged terms indicates that the inﬂation process is, almost, a
unit root. Admittedly, the historical period over which this regression is
estimated includes some bad experience. Presumably, some lessons were
learned, and, therefore, the regression may overstate somewhat the ex-
pected persistence of inﬂation in the future. Nevertheless, I believe that
BMP originally leaned too much in the opposite direction, and, therefore,
I appreciate the diﬃcult, but ultimately rewarding, work that they recently
undertook to model a persistent-inﬂation process. Temporal persistence
eﬀectively increases the risk that inﬂation represents, particularly to the
elderly, whose remaining lifetime is uncertain and whose human capital
has eﬀectively been completely depreciated. In fact, it might be interesting
to see the eﬀect on their results of a diﬀerent modeling strategy for inﬂa-
tion; as opposed to an AR(1) process, they could model independently
distributed draws of ﬁve- or ten-year inﬂation rates.
Despite its adverse implication for the level of risk being borne, inﬂation
persistence has a somewhat perverse eﬀect on the psychology of the aver-
age investor/plan participant and the demand for inﬂation indexation.
When inﬂation rates are low and heading downward, as in recent years,
the demand for inﬂation indexation will also be low. Thus, cost-of-living
adjustments in private deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans shrink and disappear.
Similarly, the inclusion of inﬂation indexation in investment and annuity
products is a hard sell. By contrast, when inﬂation rates are rising, inﬂa-
tion indexation becomes more popular. Although this is a bit like buying
Table 9C.1 Regression Results on the Persistence of Inﬂation
Variable Coeﬃcient S.E. t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.038227 0.215709 4.813088 0.0000
AR(1) 0.390129 0.071770 5.435854 0.0000
AR(2) 0.134883 0.074733 1.804873 0.0727
AR(3) 0.235019 0.070494 3.333877 0.0010
SAR(4) 0.135348 0.075979 1.781392 0.0764
R2 0.509494 Mean dependent variable 1.001664
Adjusted R2 0.499168 S.D. dependent variable 0.881805
S.E. of regression 0.624049 Akaike information
Sum squared residual 73.99306 criterion 1.920131
Log likelihood 182.2128 Schwarz criterion 2.004054
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.971298 F-statistic 49.33878
prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Inverted AR roots 0.86 0.61 0.00  0.61i 0.00  0.61i
0.24  0.47i 0.24  0.47i 0.61
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Dependent vari-
able  INFLPCT; method  least squares; sample  1950:1–1998:3; no. of observations  195.
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only inﬂuence on human behavior.
BMP end their paper with three conclusions: inﬂation-indexed annuities
can be made available in the private U.S. market, probably at little extra
cost; equities, owing to their higher expected return, should have a role in
the retirement-income portfolio; and equity-indexed variable annuities
oﬀer more to most individuals than inﬂation-indexed annuities. I agree
with all three conclusions, although I believe that the beneﬁts of inﬂation-
indexed annuities of some form are probably a bit higher than those stated
by BMP and, paradoxically, that it will be a bit more diﬃcult to oﬀer
inﬂation-indexed annuities in the United States than BMP imply.
In summary, Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba have authored a fascinating
and important paper. Their analytic conclusions seem to lead to certain
policy recommendations and research agendas. In both social security re-
form and pension-plan design, the best policy is probably to oﬀer a choice
of some combination of nominal ﬁxed, inﬂation-indexed, and equity-
indexed variable annuities. Further research on the appropriate portfolio
mix among these forms in the presence of both inﬂation and investment-
return uncertainty would be very helpful.
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Discussion Summary
Andrew Samwick remarked that investors in the model of the paper should
be allowed to earn the equity premium outside the annuity. Part of the
attractiveness of the variable annuity stems from the high return rather
than from the annuity properties. A decomposition would be useful. He
further noted that it would be interesting to model the portfolio held out-
side the annuity as realistically as possible. He suggested using the Survey
of Consumer Finances for those purposes. Finally, he argued that incorpo-
rating a role for bequests into the analysis would be desirable.
John Campbell followed up on Mark Warshawsky’s point about the per-
sistence of the inﬂation process. He stated that persistence is actually the
key to correctly judging inﬂation risk. In Campbell and Viceira (in press),
it was found that, in the postwar period, expected inﬂation follows a pro-
cess that has a root near unity. Realized inﬂation equals of course the
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cumulative-price-level uncertainty over a long horizon is vastly greater
than would be implied by an independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) process for inﬂation. People who have looked at the importance of
indexation using short-term models (e.g., Viard 1993) have found trivial
beneﬁts because there is simply not enough inﬂation risk over a single
quarter or year. Only when one brings in persistence and calculates the
cumulative uncertainty over a decade or so do substantial results obtain.
In addition, Martin Feldstein noted that it would be interesting to allow
for diﬀerent regimes for the inﬂation process, thus distinguishing within
the postwar sample the Volcker-Greenspan regime from other less favor-
able years in a diﬀerent regime.
Robert Shiller agreed with Campbell’s remark and suggested the follow-
ing rough approximation as an alternative for the Markov modeling strat-
egy in order to capture the persistence of the inﬂation process. The auth-
ors could assume that the inﬂation rate is 9 percent with probability one
in ﬁve, not just for one year as is assumed in the paper, but throughout
the rest of the retirement. In that case, retirees would value real annuities
much more.
Henning Bohn apologized for revisiting the equity-premium puzzle but
remarked that an equity-linked account obviously dominates any alterna-
tive linked to the bond rate when the equity premium is 3 percent or even
6 percent and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is taken to be only
one or two as is reported in table 9.11. Stephen Zeldes concurred and
noted that this was related to Samwick’s earlier remark.
Deborah Lucas suggested taking into account what other income the
elderly have already eﬀectively annuitized. Examples are Medicare annuit-
ies in the spirit of Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) and home own-
ership generating a stream of housing services. Given these eﬀective an-
nuitizations, one would expect the elderly to impute low value to the
annuitization of retirement income. Lucas concluded that some sensitivity
analysis of the results in the paper with respect to these phenomena would
be interesting. Feldstein added that he considers this issue in an earlier
paper (Feldstein 1999).
Stephen Ross agreed with what Campbell and Shiller had noted earlier
about the inﬂation process and remarked that correlations between the
rate of inﬂation and the return on the stock market are low. However, the
correlation between estimates of long-run expected inﬂation and the stock
market is more substantial.
David Cutler commented that one might want to consider what happens
to consumption needs late in life. For instance, it is conceivable that the
use of medical care increases. Such needs could be expected to play a role
in the design of the optimal annuity.
368 Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, and James M. PoterbaIn response to the discussion, Jeﬀrey Brown stated ﬁrst that he and his
coauthors agree with the comments concerning the persistence of the in-
ﬂation process. He added that they did consider experiments along these
lines, by drawing inﬂation shocks only once every ﬁve or ten years, rather
than annually, so as eﬀectively to introduce some persistence in a simple
manner. Unsurprisingly, this intervention made real annuities more valu-
able than nominal ones. Brown replied that Bohn’s question about the
combination of realistic equity premia and low levels of risk aversion was
important and required more thought. In response to the comment by
Warshawsky that the ratios of real to nominal payouts are similar for the
U.S. and the U.K. annuities even though the “money’s-worth” calculations
give diﬀerent results for the two countries, Brown made two points. First,
mortality in the United Kingdom, based on cohort-speciﬁc life tables, was
more “favorable.” Second, and mainly, the real interest rate was substan-
tially lower in the United Kingdom than in the United States.
Poterba noted that Shiller’s suggestion to allow for a nonzero probabil-
ity of high inﬂation throughout retirement could be thought of as being
the opposite polar case of what was done in the paper and had been pur-
sued in Poterba and Warshawsky (1998). With regard to the equity-
premium puzzle and the low level of risk aversion, Brown stated that calcu-
lations for higher coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion would be reported
in the ﬁnal version of the paper. Finally, Brown replied to Ross’s comment
about the low correlation between equity returns and inﬂation at high fre-
quency, especially using measured inﬂation, by referring to work done by
Boudoukh and Richardson (1993). He noted that a more elaborate anal-
ysis requires modeling the expected inﬂation process, another interesting
extension of this research.
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